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Abstract 
 
 Emerging from decades of war, yet still stricken by poverty, political instability, health issues 
and food insecurity, South Sudan has entered a new era of development and nation-building. 
Speaking at the 2011 UN General Assembly, Salva Kiir, President of South Sudan, formally invited 
the international development community to the new nation, stating, ―our march out of the abyss of 
poverty and deprivation into the realm of progress and prosperity is going to be a long one and that is 
why we need you to partner us on this difficult journey‖ (Kiir 2011). While the international 
community has provided Southern Sudan with humanitarian assistance for decades, only now are they 
stepping into the role of planning and implementing development projects to ―improve‖ South 
Sudan‘s economy, infrastructure and social services.  
 Taking the emergent forms of developer involvement in South Sudan as a starting point, this 
study examines whether the development community has translated decades of scholarly critique (e.g. 
De Waal 1989, 2005; Ferguson 1990; Sachs 1992; Scott 1976, 1998; Scudder 2005, 2009) into 
improved practice. To do so I compare the planning stages of two instances of ―development‖ in 
South Sudan: colonial (Anglo-Egyptian) and post-colonial (contemporary). As the development 
community is involved in many sectors of South Sudanese society, I have narrowed my focus to 
instances of hydro-development, namely the Jonglei Canal (Anglo-Egyptian project) and the current 
push for agricultural expansion, which will require intensive irrigation schemes to reach desired 
outcomes. In this study I argue that while nearly two hundred years have passed since the onset of 
Anglo-Egyptian ―development‖ in Southern Sudan, contemporary development actors in South Sudan 
hold the same ―high modernist‖ biases which have in the past produced harmful and unintended 
consequences for affected populations.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 A new chapter in Sudanese history began in Naivasha, Kenya on January 9, 2005 
when the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People‘s Liberation Movement (SPLM) 
signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) formally ending Sudan‘s twenty-two year 
civil war. Brokered by the international community, the agreement established power and 
resource sharing agreements between the North and South and made provisions for four 
referendums to be held in 2011: the first allowing the South to vote for its independence; the 
second giving the oil-rich Abyei region the option to join the North or South; with the third 
and fourth allowing for the Sudanese states of the Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile to vote 
for more autonomy. While the agreement did not bring a halt to conflict between the North 
and South, violent confrontation dwindled in favor of a war of words. Questions of oil, 
division of national debt, and Khartoum‘s willingness to cooperate with an independent 
South Sudan have dominated the (trans)national debate since the CPA.  
 No nation exists in isolation, and thus the future of Sudan held implications for the 
international community. Considering South Sudan's wealth of oil reserves and geostrategic 
location, foreign governments had more invested in the peace process relative to previous 
conflicts in Africa (Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo). Since the signing of 
the CPA, China and the United States have been actively involved in Sudanese politics, 
hoping to gain (United States) or sustain (China) access to Sudan‘s oil reserves. Eager to 
establish new alliances in the region and see Sudan‘s oil reserves in friendly hands, the 
United States strongly advocated for South Sudan‘s independence. For example, in 
November 2010, U.S. Senator John Kerry offered to remove Khartoum from a list of state 
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sponsors of terrorism if the 2011 referendum went ahead peacefully – in August 2011 the 
State Department retracted its offer and Sudan remains blacklisted. China on the other hand, 
who has historically relied on Khartoum for fuel, also began to work with both northern and 
southern governments to secure a peaceful transition. It is clear that South Sudan‘s oil 
reserves have received overwhelming attention from the international community, and 
scholarship has also followed this trend; however, an often under discussed resource will, I 
argue, play a more formative role in Sudan‘s future: water. With this in mind, perhaps it is 
best to reexamine the advent of the CPA and South Sudan‘s recent independence.  
** 
 A new chapter in South Sudanese history began as celebrations erupted in the streets 
of Juba on July 9, 2011 following its independence. Eager to move beyond its history of 
relative poverty, economic and infrastructural inadequacies, as compared to its previous 
northern counterpart, the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) has actively sought the 
assistance of the international ―development1‖ community (Kiir 2011). Considering that 
nation‘s inability to build a sustainable economy on finite and contested oil reserves, the 
development community has prioritized large scale agricultural growth, which it believes will 
boost South Sudan‘s economy and food security (Barber 2011; European Union 2011; 
Norwegian People‘s Aid 2011; The United Nations 2011; USAID 2011).  While the region‘s 
agricultural potential is vast –considering the abundance of (―unclaimed‖) fertile land and 
water from rivers and rainfall – obstacles such as flooding and a lack of irrigation schemes 
currently inhibit a smooth transition to large scale agriculture (De Mabior 1980). Thus, in 
                                                 
1
 Building from Ferguson (1990) and Scott (1998) this study problematizes the concept of ―development.‖ I 
recognize that while development projects may be well intentioned, their outcomes are often outside the 
control of project planners due to the simplistic and ―scientific‖ worldview of social planners, which cannot 
account for local realities, human and environmental.  
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order for South Sudan to achieve its ―full‖ agricultural potential, small dams, canals and 
irrigation schemes will be necessary. As seen in the past with the Jonglei Canal and Aswan 
High Dam – expanded upon in Chapter 5 – hydro-projects such as dams and canals go hand 
in hand with the creation of large ―modern‖ agricultural operations. Hydro and agricultural 
development are inseparable and the question of South Sudan‘s water as a resource for 
agricultural development will be of paramount importance in the country‘s formative years. 
 Time and again scholars have critiqued development initiatives for failing to 
positively impact the lives of affected populations (e.g. De Waal 2005; Ferguson 1990; Sachs 
1992; Scott 1976, 1998; Scudder 2005, 2009). Now, with international funds flooding South 
Sudan and the international community shifting from providing humanitarian aid to assuming 
a role of development assistance, scholars are presented with an excellent opportunity to 
examine whether the development community has translated such critiques into improved 
practice. In this thesis, I take agriculture and water as a point of departure to document 
emergent discourse regarding plans to develop South Sudan.  I analyze this discourse in 
relation to both the unfolding narrative of colonial and post-colonial intervention in Sudan 
over the past two hundred years and the critical scholarly literature on development and 
forced displacement and resettlement. This research, therefore, contributes to a very small, 
but rapidly growing, body of literature on development initiatives in a nation that, of this 
writing, has yet to mark its first year of independence 
 Working on a project where so much is in flux presents real challenges to the 
researcher.  For instance, South Sudan‘s political instability made it impossible for me to 
conduct research in the region
2
.  Similarly, conditions in conflict and post-conflict Sudan 
                                                 
2
 As an undergraduate, I would also not have been granted Institutional Review Board permission to conduct 
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have suppressed other kinds of scholarly endeavors.  Given these conditions, the role of 
development organizations is inflated and they take on a disproportionate role in producing 
knowledge about South Sudan. Thus, a critical examination of this development discourse 
literature is an important and – to my knowledge – untouched topic in the literature on South 
Sudan. Accordingly, I have crafted my thesis on the information available to me. While I 
could have conducted interviews with development personnel who have worked in South 
Sudan, I opted to analyze what they put in the public sphere in lieu of what they may have 
revealed in anonymous interviews. I recognize that many individuals involved in developing 
South Sudan may be personally invested and that their personal views may not accord with 
their institution‘s approach. The level of the individual development worker is, however, 
beyond the scope of my analysis
3
. In the absence of interviews with members of the 
development community, I have conducted a qualitative analysis of development reports and 
articles to explore how Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Inter-Governmental 
Organizations (IGOs) are approaching development in South Sudan.  
 In order to analyze development in South Sudan I have consulted the theoretical 
frameworks laid out by Ferguson (1990) and Scott (1998), De Waal‘s analysis of 
humanitarian aid in Darfur, Sudan (1989, 2005) and Scudder‘s work on forced migration and 
resettlement (2005, 2009). I have also considered Sudan specific literature consulting past 
ethnographic research (Evans-Pritchard 1940), colonial era Southern Sudanese history in the 
form of 19th century Western travel narratives and turn of the 20th century New York Times 
articles, and scholarly literature on previous agricultural development in the region (De 
                                                                                                                                                       
such research.  
3
 I acknowledge that had I conducted interviews my study would have taken a different direction, perhaps 
examining the gap between individual and institutional development interests and approaches.  
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Mabior 1980) and hydro-projects in Sudan, the Jonglei Canal and Aswan High Dam.  
 The concept of plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose
4
 best encapsulates the 
argument that follows. While more than two decades have passed since Ferguson‘s 
pioneering and provocative exploration of the ―development‖ apparatus (1990) – twelve 
since Scott‘s publication of Seeing Like a State – I will show that in the formatives stages of 
development in South Sudan, NGOs, IGOs and the South Sudanese State have maintained 
the same worldview – understanding societies as unitary, aregional and ahistorical objects of 
development – which doomed development in Lesotho (Ferguson 1990), the USSR, and 
Tanzania (Scott 1998) to name but a few examples. In the case of South Sudan I argue that 
―development‖ actors, old (Anglo-Egyptian administrators) and new (development 
organizations), have systematically failed to recognize the inseparable relationship between 
the South Sudanese and their environment, conditioned by the flow of the Nile River. First, I 
will show that Anglo-Egyptian officials created an imaginary region for ―development,‖ as a 
result of what Scott (1998:4) defines as ―high modernist‖ values: ―a strong, one might even 
say muscle-bound, version of the self-confidence about scientific and technical progress, the 
expansion of production, the growing satisfaction of human needs, the mastery of nature 
(including human nature), and above all, the rational design of social order commensurate 
with the scientific understanding of natural laws.‖ Their flawed understandings of South 
Sudan gave rise to the poorly planned Jonglei Canal, whose partial construction has 
permanently and negatively altered the livelihoods of the South Sudanese. Moving to the 
present, I will show that despite years of scholarly inquiry and critiques of the development 
community, NGOs, IGOs and the GoSS are approaching agricultural expansion through the 
                                                 
4
 The more things change, the more they stay the same.  
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same ―scientific‖ and ―high modernist‖ lens problematized by Ferguson and Scott. In order 
for South Sudan to become an ―agro-industrial powerhouse,‖ some of its most fertile regions 
will have to be reorganized spatially (village collectivization), economically (changes in 
livelihoods) and environmentally (hydro-development) (De Mabior 1980). However, as a 
result of ―high modernist‖ worldviews, development actors, on an institutional level, have yet 
to actively discuss the livelihoods of the South Sudanese and how water relates to agro-
development. If this discursive trend continues, it is unlikely that development actors will be 
able to effectively respond to the possible negative repercussions of agricultural growth such 
as resettlement. Given the consequences of poorly planned development, in my final chapter, 
I ask what can be learned from Sudan‘s past experiences with agricultural and hydro 
development. To do so I interrogate the cases of the Jonglei Canal and Aswan High Dam, 
which both accommodated agricultural expansion and resulted in poor resettlement initiatives 
for affected populations. The recently published World Commission on Dams report (WCD) 
serves as a framework for future dam construction and its guidelines seek to protect local 
populations from repetitions of Jonglei and Aswan. However, I will show that in the case of 
South Sudan the WCD‘s recommendations have yet to translate into practice, indicating the 
continuation of past harmful approaches to hydro-project planning, implementation and 
resettlement initiatives.  
 As a final note, in the late 1970s, John Garang De Mabior
5
 conducted interviews with 
thousands of Southern Sudanese in areas where agricultural development was to occur. He 
found that:  
                                                 
5
 John Garang de Mabior, a Dinka from Southern Sudan, served as the leader of the Sudan People's Liberation 
Army (SPLA) and led the resistance against Khartoum during Sudan's Second Civil War. The interviews 
referenced above were conducted as part of his PhD research on agricultural development in Southern 
Sudan. 
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The inhabitants of the JPA [Jonglei Projects Area], although poor and illiterate, are 
nevertheless intelligent, creative and responsive, and will participate in change of 
whatever magnitude if they perceive such change to be in their interests and that of 
their posterity. Indeed, the people in the rural areas of the JPA appear to be more 
interested in change than some of their educated brethren who appear to be mission-
bound to protect the Dinka, Nuer or Shilluk ‗way of life‘ which they themselves 
appear to have rejected. (1980:6) 
 
Recognizing the motivations of the South Sudanese to develop their nation‘s economy, I do 
not argue that South Sudan should remain as is; rather, my analysis exposes flaws in the 
conceptualization of plans for how these changes will occur, as the consequences of poorly 
planned and executed development can be disastrous. 
 
Framing the Issues: 
 Douglas H. Johnson, a historian of Sudan, has pointed out that a main weakness of 
Sudan studies is that Northern Sudan has received ―respectful attention and explanation, 
while the rest of the country is relegated to an exotic periphery‖  (2003: xvi). For the most 
part Johnson‘s statement holds true, though some scholars have devoted their work to South 
Sudan in specific. As an example, Stephanie Beswick‘s Sudan's Blood Memory: The Legacy 
of War, Ethnicity, and Slavery in South Sudan (2006) examined the region's previously 
unexplored pre-colonial history, while scholars such as Collins (1962, 1983) have examined 
Southern Sudanese history as part of a larger project on Sudan‘s history. In regards to the 
people of South Sudan, scholars such as Evans-Pritchard (1940) and Sharon Hutchinson 
(1996) have studied the Nuer, while Francis Deng‘s work (1984) focused on the Dinka. 
Holtzman (2000) and Shandy (2007) have examined the South Sudanese diaspora. Since the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, South Sudan has garnered more scholarly 
8 
 
  
attention predominantly focusing on potential outcomes of the referendum vote, discussing 
the likelihood of a return to violence (Arbetman-Rabinowitz and Johnson 2008; and L. Deng 
2005), the mutual dependence of both Juba and Khartoum upon each other (Arbetman-
Rabinowitz and Johnson 2008), ethnic pluralism and the complexities of building a unitary 
South Sudanese nationality (Olowu 2011), and the importance and economic potential of 
Southern oil reserves (Arbetman-Rabinowitz and Johnson 2008; and Sullivan and Nasrallah 
2010). Some limited research was also conducted on the hydropolitics of South Sudan‘s 
independence (Ahmad 2008; Sullivan and Nasrallah 2010; and Salman 2011). Little has been 
written to date on South Sudan‘s recent independence. This is likely a function of the 
timeline for scholarly publishing as well as scholars hedging their bets in the face of 
uncertain outcomes. Upon this writing, little research has been produced on development, 
agriculture and the role of water in South Sudan‘s future. Given that South Sudan only 
became independent in July 2011 and the political complications and risks of conducting 
research in the region, this silence is understandable. Thus, in the absence of contemporary 
development in South Sudan, I rely on the theoretical frameworks of Ferguson (1990), Scott 
(1998) and Scudder (2005, 2009) to shape my study.  
 Simply put, development as an institution and practice has failed to produce its 
intended goals. Neo-Marxists attribute the shortcomings of development to its capitalist 
nature, arguing that development actors ―only reinforce the system which in the first place 
causes the poverty‖ by incorporating ―Third World‖ countries into the global capitalist 
system (Ferguson 1990:11). James Ferguson complicates Marxist understandings of 
development in The anti-politics machine, where he analyzes the discourse of 
―development,‖ concluding that while such ―projects‖ may be well intentioned, the 
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subsequent effects are far from what planners ever imagined. Capitalism is not the problem 
with ―development‖ (though it certainly contributes to poor outcomes), rather ―development‖ 
fails as a result of its own worldview, which this research documents in the case of South 
Sudan.   
 Stemming from a lack of local knowledge and understanding of regional and 
historical realities, ―development‖ organizations reduce countries to ―technical problems,‖ 
defining underdevelopment through purely economic indicators that they, as Western 
institutions can understand. As a result, ―development‖ is unable to account for local 
particularities, such as differing livelihoods, or the seemingly hidden political agenda of 
certain projects, and may produce unintended negative consequences for affected 
populations. 
 While scholarship on the aid industry is vast, I have selected two noteworthy texts to 
explore ―development‖ discourse and its unintended side-effects: the work of Ferguson 
(1990) and James Scott‘s Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human 
Condition Have Failed (1998). When combined, these scholars complement each other to 
form a framework for understanding the ineffectual nature of ―development.‖ One may query 
the relevance of 20th century frameworks for 21st century realities; however, as I will show 
through the case of South Sudan, the ―development‖ industry on the whole has seen little 
change since the publication of their works. 
 Prior to James Ferguson‘s work, there existed two prominent understandings of the 
―development‖ community. The first regarded foreign ―aid‖ to the ―Third World‖ as 
inherently good, and studied ―development‖ actors ―to enable it [them] to perform better, to 
avoid failures and to maximize its [their] success‖ (Ferguson 1990:10). Another more radical 
10 
 
  
view, championed by neo-Marxist scholars, argued that ―development‖ was an industry 
which produced poverty, by incorporating ―Less Developed Countries‖ (LDCs) into the 
global capitalist system (Ferguson 1990:11). However, by examining rural development in 
Lesotho, Ferguson complicated previously held assumptions regarding the intentions and 
results of ―aid‖ actors, viewing ―development‖ as a discourse; that the failures of the 
international community in the Third World are a result of the way NGOs understand 
themselves and the communities they seek to ―help.‖ Below, I summarize key points from 
Ferguson‘s theory to illustrate the discursively based failings of ―development.‖ 
 Ferguson‘s primary argument is that ―development‖ fails to bring about its intended 
―improvements‖ to society due to the self-proclaimed anti-political nature of its enactors. 
Accordingly, NGO‘s construct an aregional and ahistorical country to ―develop,‖ and thus, 
subsequent ―projects‖ are unable to address the structural, underlying problems that 
contribute to poverty within a given society. For example, the theoretical construction of 
Lesotho, the ethnographic ―site‖ of Ferguson‘s study, ―...can be presented in ―development‖ 
discourse as a nation of farmers, not wage laborers; a country with a geography, but no 
history; with people, but no classes; values, but no structures; administrators, but no rulers; 
bureaucracy, but no politics. Political and structural causes of poverty in Lesotho are 
systematically erased and replaced with technical ones...‖ (Ferguson 1990:66). As a result of 
this imaginary Lesotho, ―development‖ actors attributed the country‘s poverty to the absence 
of a ―national economy,‖ and believed that they could facilitate economic ―improvement‖ 
through road building projects, for example. Not surprisingly, the infrastructural 
―development‖ brought by NGOs did little to address poverty alleviation and produced 
unintended and unforeseen changes to Lesotho. Rather than addressing poverty, the 
11 
 
  
construction of roads bolstered state power, granting the central government control over 
previously inaccessible communities. To quote Ferguson: ―The ―development‖ apparatus in 
Lesotho is not a machine for eliminating poverty that is incidentally involved with the state 
bureaucracy; it is a machine for reinforcing and expanding the exercise of bureaucratic state 
power, which incidentally takes ―poverty‖ as its point of entry...‖ (Ferguson 1990:254). As 
demonstrated, Ferguson‘s critique of ―development‖ in Lesotho moves beyond previously 
held understandings of the ―aid‖ industry. Scholars should no longer understand 
―development‖ as a ―practical tool for the solution of universal problems‖ (solution: help 
NGOs see what they‘re doing wrong) or as an extension of poverty inducing capitalism 
(solution: end capitalism); rather, ―development‖ should be understood as a discourse, which 
produces unintended side-effects. So, how does one overcome the ―development‖ 
problematic? Ferguson concludes that poverty alleviation must be realized by the local 
populations that will be directly affected, and that ―development‖ cannot be brought by the 
State or through NGOs 
 Although James Scott's Seeing Like a State focuses primarily on sovereign 
―development‖ projects – that is to say when States, rather than extra-national third parties, 
seek to improve the lives of their own populations – his conclusions are invaluable to 
understanding the failures of the ―development‖ industry. Scott argues that ―schemes to 
improve the human condition‖ have failed due to ―an authoritarian disregard for the values, 
desires, and objections of their subjects,‖ masked by the strictly quantitative worldview held 
by ―development‖ actors such as, engineers, bureaucrats and scientists. Often operating far 
from sites of development, States and NGOs have enforced what Scott terms as ―legibility,‖ a 
central process of modern statecraft, upon people and the environment. ―The premodern state 
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was, in many crucial respects, partially blind: it knew precious little about its subjects, their 
wealth, their landholdings and yields, their location, their very identity. It lacked anything 
like a detailed ‗map‘ of its terrain and people‖ (1998: 2). In order to control people and the 
environment, state officials created a ―standard grid‖ to understand ―illegible and local social 
practices.‖ Censuses, maps, ―the design of cities,‖ ―the creation of permanent last names, the 
standardization of weights and measures,‖ and ―the organization of transportation‖ all served 
as tools to reduce local knowledge to comprehensible information for state bureaucrats (Scott 
1998:2). The problem with these ―scientific‖ tools is that they understand nature and people 
as constant, with no consideration for local geography, environmental conditions, culture or 
livelihoods, and as a result are unable to meet their intended goals. Like Ferguson, Scott 
argues that the failures of ―development‖ are linked to the ways in which ―aid‖ actors view 
the countries they seek ―help;‖ however, Scott envisions an alternative solution to the 
―development‖ problematic and believes that social planning can be improved by sacrificing 
legibility and incorporating mētis, local knowledge, into project plans. 
 In Seeing Like a State, James Scott explains that the origins of purely quantitative 
representations of nature and society are grounded in the practice of scientific forestry in 19th 
century Prussia. Scientific forestry, emerging as a result of economic tunnel vision, viewed 
nature as something that could be controlled and reorganized for the benefit of man. In order 
to undertake forestry on such a large scale, scientists and European states began to view 
forests from a macro perspective, reducing the forest to legible statistical data, replacing ―the 
actual tree with its vast number of possible uses... [with] an abstract tree representing the 
volume of lumber or firewood‖ (Scott 1998:12). Following the reduction of nature to 
numbers and statistics came efforts to redesign and normalize nature into something that man 
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could easily control. Scott contends that this bird‘s eye view of the forest (society), where the 
actual tree (individuals) is reduced to an abstract tree (demographic statistics), and 
subsequent efforts to normalize forests were doomed to fail their intended goals, as the 
universal scientific theories Europeans drew from the ―ideal forest‖ could not account for 
nature‘s constant change. These statistical understandings of nature were eventually applied 
to society itself, enforcing quantitative legibility to contexts requiring nuanced qualitative 
understandings. Scott supports this claim with a variety of case studies, such as compulsory 
villagization in Tanzania and Soviet collectivization, and outlines the disastrous effects 
stemming from social planners‘ trust in the ―hegemonic imperium of scientific knowledge‖ 
(1998:323). In each of these cases, Scott argues that had States incorporated local knowledge 
into the planning and implementation of these projects catastrophe could have been averted. 
Furthermore, Scott also argues that the Gezira Irrigation Scheme, a British hydrological 
reorganization of Sudanese land qualifies under the same model, though he does not explore 
this example at length. Nevertheless, his mention of the scheme shows the applicability of his 
theories to instances of hydro-development.  
 Further, I have also incorporated Thayer Scudder‘s four-stage resettlement theory to 
examine ways in which the disruption caused by development and resettlement can be 
lessened. As the effects of anticipated agricultural growth in South Sudan will be long 
lasting, the unique nature of Scudder‘s longitudinal studies of dam-induced displacement is 
crucial to understanding South Sudan‘s future. Since the 1960s, Scudder has documented the 
effects of large dams and resettlement on local populations, most notably through his 
longitudinal and ethnographic research on the Kariba Dam and its impact on the Gwembe 
Tonga (1962; 1965;1993; Scudder and Colson 1980). From these studies, Scudder has pieced 
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together an effective model for successful resettlement processes (2001, 2009) to which I 
dedicate several pages in Chapter 5. Central to Scudder‘s findings on failed resettlement 
initiatives, consistent with the theories of Ferguson and Scott, has been a lack of planner 
cooperation with local populations. 
 In sum, this study applies the frameworks of Ferguson, Scott, and Scudder, to argue 
that development must be produced on a state-by-state basis, with the collaboration of local 
populations and not just governmental officials. Western ―development‖ discourse has 
proven to be ineffectual in addressing poverty, as it is unable to politicize itself, and when it 
is politically motivated (as in the case of Scott), it negatively impacts local populations by 
reducing them to mathematical equations. In the argument that follows I will show that this 
problematic worldview has surfaced in the formative stages of development planning in 
South Sudan. 
 
Methodology 
 Central to this paper is an analysis of past and contemporary ―development‖ discourse 
on South Sudan.  I have relied on two different sets of primary sources. I pieced together the 
Anglo-Egyptian conceptions of South Sudan by examining mid to late 19th and early 20th 
century Western travel narratives and New York Times articles. As I was unable to travel to 
the University of Durham archives, I relied on the New York Times articles to provide 
examples of colonial discourse as uttered by Anglo-Egyptian officials and servicemen. In an 
effort to understand contemporary development discourse on South Sudan, I conducted a 
qualitative analysis on a sample of twenty-four development reports from various 
nongovernmental organizations, intergovernmental organizations and governmental 
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organizations, such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). 
The documents were selected to provide a holistic view of how aid actors describe South 
Sudan and envision its future and to examine the contemporary development worldview.  
 Using these samples of colonial and contemporary discourse on South Sudan, I have 
conducted the same method of analysis employed by Ferguson (1990). To quote him directly: 
―instead of ignoring the orderly field of statements produced by the ‗development‘ apparatus 
on the grounds that the statements are ideological, the study below takes this field as its point 
of departure for an exploration of the way in which ‗development‘ initiatives are produced 
and put into practice‖ (1990:18). By examining the things colonial administrators and 
development organizations say about South Sudan I have pieced together the institutional 
worldviews that have produced development, and its unintended side-effects, in the region.  
 
Prospectus  
 My second chapter, ―Situating South Sudan,‖ provides a foundational overview of 
South Sudan‘s geography, people and ecology, and its long history of exploitation by foreign 
powers. As this study examines the aregional, ahistorical and ―scientific‖ worldview that 
development organizations subscribe to, I use this chapter to describe the inextricable 
relationship between the region‘s agro/pastoralist groups, water, seasons and territory, which 
has remained neglected by ―development‖ planners over the past century. I then move into a 
discussion of the political changes in South Sudan over the past two hundred years, focusing 
on the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods. I pay specific attention to the inflow 
and outflow of outsiders in the region and their role in the ―underdevelopment‖ of South 
Sudan. I conclude with an examination of Sudan‘s civil wars, recent peace agreement and 
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independence. 
 In Chapter Three, ―South Sudan and ‗High Modernist‘ Planning During the Anglo-
Egyptian Condominium,‖ I discuss the planning processes of hydrological ―development‖ in 
Southern Sudan during the colonial era. I use this chapter to establish a historical point of 
comparison for contemporary development in the region. Using Western travel narratives and 
New York Times articles I show that Southern Sudan‘s hydro-geography came to be 
characterized as ―dangerous‖ and ―wasteful.‖ This construction of an imaginary Southern 
Sudan gave rise to the Jonglei Canal, a ―development‖ project aimed at ―taming‖ the region‘s 
environment. In the planning process I show that the ―development‖ worldview theorized by 
Ferguson and Scott contributed to the project‘s negative outcome for the South Sudanese 
people – elaborated on in Chapter 5.  
 Chapter Four, ―History Repeating Itself?: Agricultural ‗Development‘ In Sovereign 
South Sudan,‖ brings my study to the present and complicates NGO, IGO and the South 
Sudanese state‘s ambitions to transform the country into an ―agro-industrial powerhouse‖ 
(Kiir 2011). I will show that although nearly two hundred years have passed since the 
beginnings of Anglo-Egyptian involvement with the region‘s hydro-geography, the formative 
stages of agricultural expansion in South Sudan indicate that contemporary development 
actors and South Sudanese government officials are approaching the country through the 
same ―technical‖ and over-simplified lens. As a result, the real environmental and social 
consequences of agricultural transformation have been overlooked and under discussed.  
 Chapter 5, ―Dams, Canals, and Resettlement: What Can Be Learned From Sudan‘s 
Past?,‖ examines what South Sudan‘s future may hold through an interrogation of past 
ecologically disruptive projects that serve as comparison cases. I begin with an examination 
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of what resettlement entails for affected populations and what successful relocation looks like 
using the work of Thayer Scudder. I then focus on the cases of the Jonglei Canal and Aswan 
High Dam, to illustrate the implications of poorly planned and executed resettlement and 
compensation initiatives. Furthermore, I ask what can be learned from these case studies 
when implementing agricultural projects in South Sudan. Lastly, I summarize the current 
World Commission on Dams guidelines for future dam construction, which if adhered to may 
avoid the disruptions associated with the Jonglei Canal and Aswan High Dam and question 
why, thus far, the recommendations have received little to no attention from the development 
community.  
 In Chapter 6, I conclude my study and discuss my study‘s contribution to gaps in 
literature on South Sudan. As shown, the beginnings of agricultural expansion in the country 
indicate a return to reoccurring themes of flawed development practice as a result of 
institutional worldviews. Only the coming years will tell what the future holds for the newly 
independent nation, yet the formative stages of development planning indicate potentially 
harmful outcomes for the Southern Sudanese.  
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Chapter 2: Situating South Sudan 
If geography is one of the imperishable themes of the past 200 years of Sudanese 
history, Sudan's differing land mass and rainfall have sheltered an estimated 600 
ethnic and linguistic groups, scores of which have consisted of only a few individuals. 
(Collins 2008:4) 
 
 This chapter introduces the country of South Sudan, its people and ecology, and 
recent history. One cannot understand contemporary events in South Sudan without this 
foundational understanding of people and place. The chapter is divided into three sections. 
The first deals with South Sudan‘s geography and natural resources. The second focuses on 
the people of South Sudan and their relationship with the local environment. Lastly, I will 
examine South Sudan‘s recent history, setting the stage for my analysis of contemporary 
South Sudan. As the nation only became independent in 2011, it is impossible to disentangle 
its history from that of Sudan. Thus, I will provide a brief history of Sudan, its experiences 
with colonialism, and its civil wars with an emphasis on the South.  
** 
Locating South Sudan: 
 South Sudan, located in East-Central Africa, shares borders with Sudan to the north, 
Ethiopia to the East, Uganda and Kenya to the south, and the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo and the Central African Republic to the west. Its total land area is 644,329 square 
kilometers, about the size of France, ranking it the 42nd largest country in the world. South 
Sudan‘s climate differs greatly from the North (largely arid desert, with infrequent rainfall 
and summer temperatures reaching 120 degrees Fahrenheit), it is tropical with exceptionally 
fertile land. During the rainy season, between April and October, up to 50 inches of rain may 
fall, allowing the South Sudanese to practice rain fed agriculture – an impossibility in the 
North, which relies solely on irrigated agriculture.  
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 At present, South Sudan‘s most internationally discussed and desired resource has 
been oil, found in the Abyei region along the border with Sudan. As South Sudan has no 
infrastructure to move and refine its oil, Khartoum – which has been unwilling to relinquish 
the South‘s oil wealth – has forced the South to pay the North for oil transportation to the 
outside world; this has led to political disagreements between the two governments, which 
have yet to reach a durable agreement. Nevertheless, as I argue in this paper, South Sudan‘s 
water, rather than oil, and its contribution to agricultural growth will play a more significant 
role in South Sudan‘s future.  
 While the country is land locked, water is one of its most plentiful natural resources. 
The Nile, which travels through the center of South Sudan, provides fertile agricultural land 
to the South Sudanese and has informed South Sudan‘s experiences with outside powers, 
who first encountered the region as a result of Nile exploration (see Chapter 3). Furthermore, 
vast swamps, the Sudd, created by the Nile River, extend for 1000,000 square kilometers, 
amounting to 15% of South Sudan‘s land area. Most importantly, the river and the 
environmental conditions it creates have played a formative role in the livelihoods of local 
populations. 
 ** 
The People of South Sudan:  
 Home to over 200 ethnic groups, South Sudan boasts a very diverse demography. 
According to a recent study South Sudan‘s ethnic distribution is as such: Dinkas 35.8%; 
Nuers 15.6%; Shiluks, Anuaks, Lovas et al 8.9%; Azandes 8.4%; Baris 8.3%; Lotukos 4.8%; 
Arabs 3.1%; Others 15.1% (Izady 2011). When considering the blurred lines boundaries of 
ethnicity in the south, the nation‘s demography becomes even more complex. The Dinka, the 
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country‘s largest ethnic group, began to migrate to the region in the thirteenth century, to 
escape slave raids and drought. Initially the Dinka established themselves as a predominant 
ethnic group through violence with the majority of southern groups such as the Funj, Shilluk, 
and Murle. This cycle of violence continued until the 17th century and is still remembered in 
Sudanese oral traditions (Beswick 2004:42). However, the territory acquired by the Dinka in 
these military campaigns has not remained permanent. For example, in the early 19th century 
Nuer subgroups began to migrate from their traditionally inhabited territory into Dinka and 
Anuak lands, effectively tripling their land base and increasing their numbers by 
―assimilating tens of thousands of Dinka residents, captives and immigrants in their wake. As 
one contemporary Nuer man laughingly summed up the results of the longstanding 
assimilation trend: ―There are no [real] Nuer. We are all Dinka‖ (Hutchinson 2000:8-9). 
These comments point towards another characteristic of ethnicity in South Sudan, its fluidity.  
 Sudanese concepts of ethnicity are constantly evolving depending on economic 
stresses, environmental conditions and politics. Recently violence between Nuer and Dinka 
groups has strengthened people‘s ties to their own ethnic group (Hutchinson 2000), and 
changed what constitutes a Nuer or Dinka person. Amongst the Dinka, ethnicity has come to 
privilege ―human blood lines‖ in deciding whether or not someone is ―Dinka.‖ The Nuer on 
the other hand have come to view their ethnicity as an ―honorific title‖ dependent on social 
approval – anyone can become a Nuer and at the same time people can be stripped of their 
―Nuerness‖ (Hutchinson 2000:9). This fluidity of ethnicity is not only characteristic of the 
south, but of Sudan at large. For example, in the western region of Darfur during times of 
economic stress many Fur agriculturalists ―became‖ Baggara by transitioning to a nomadic 
lifestyle (Haaland 1969). This complex relationship between what constitutes Fur and 
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Baggara signals another important determinant of culture and ethnicity: the environment. 
 Central to this thesis is agricultural development in South Sudan and the possible 
construction of new dams and irrigation projects to facilitate large scale farming. Thus, it is 
imperative to have an understanding of how South Sudan‘s environment has impacted the 
lives of local populations. I will illustrate the relationship between the South Sudanese and 
the environment through Evans-Pritchard‘s study of the Nuer (1940). This particular attention 
to the transhumant livelihoods of the Nuer is intentional. While certain ethnic groups like the 
Azande people, located in southwestern South Sudan, have practiced sedentary rain fed 
agriculture for centuries, the Nuer and other groups with similar livelihoods such as the 
Dinka, Shilluk and Murle who inhabit some of the country‘s richest agricultural regions have 
not. For these transhumant groups agricultural development will bring the most radical 
change – elaborated upon in Chapter 4 – requiring environmental and cultural reorganization 
as well as the possibility of resettlement.  
 In The Nuer, Evans-Prichard highlights the importance of South Sudan‘s environment 
in forming the livelihoods of the Nuer. He describes the region‘s climate and geography in 
these terms:  
The main characteristics of Nuerland are: (I) It is dead flat. (2) It has clay soils. (3) It 
is very thinly and sporadically wooded. (4) It is covered with high grasses in the rains. 
(5) It is subject to heavy rainfall. (6) It is traversed by large rivers which flood 
annually. (7) When the rains cease and the rivers fall it is subject to severe drought‖ 
(Evans-Pritchard 1940:55).   
 
In his fieldwork Evans-Pritchard found that these environmental conditions had played a 
significant influence on the lives of the Nuer and their social structure. Given that South 
Sudan experiences climactic extremes – during the rainy season an excess of water and 
during the dry season a propensity for drought – which render purely horticultural livelihoods 
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impractical and risky, the Nuer have relied, in large part, on cattle husbandry for their food 
security; however, small scale farming and fishing still play an important role in Nuer 
livelihoods. As Evans-Pritchard observed, ―The necessity of a mixed economy follows from 
the ecological equilibrium. Rinderpest prevents complete dependence upon milk foods; 
climate prevents complete dependence on grain; and hydrological variations prevent 
complete dependence on fish. These three elements together enable Nuer to live, and their 
seasonal distribution determines Nuer modes of life at different periods of the year‖ (Evans-
Pritchard 1940:92).  Thus, as one can imagine, Nuer communities are not sedentary. In fact, 
―villages‖ can be as long as 30 kilometers (De Mabior 1981:71), as cattle must be fed, grains 
must be grown, and fish must be caught all in different locales – a mode of subsistence called 
transhumance.  
 While political instability, the introduction of a cash economy and land ownership 
have changed the lives of the Nuer as documented by Hutchinson (1996). Her research 
suggests that they have continued to practice transhumance and that cattle continue to hold an 
important place in society. As developed in Chapter 5, the Jonglei Canal has disrupted the 
environmental conditions of the Sudd and in turn local livelihoods. As a result of the canal, 
Nuer, Dinka, and Shilluk migrations have been drastically altered, and they have been forced 
to adopt new ways of reaching grazing areas; however, the transhumant nature of local 
populations remains largely the same, tied to the seasonal flooding of the Nile River. As the 
international community and South Sudanese State continue with development, it is essential 
that these long held practices do not go unnoticed as a result of the ―high modernist‖ and 
―scientific‖ worldview of social planners.  
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** 
Sudan's Modern History: Colonialism, Wars, and the Birth of Two Countries: 
 Until the early 19th century, southern Sudan remained largely untouched by foreign, 
northern powers; however, beginning in the 19th century this long held isolation from 
invasions ended. While southern populations had been exploited for slaves by the Sennar and 
Darfur sultanates during the 16th and 17th centuries, the extent of the slave raids was not far 
reaching and was largely limited to the western Bahr al-Ghazal region, the Nuba mountains 
and the White Nile plains. By the eighteenth century northern slave raids met resistance from 
the southern Shilluk kingdom and Dinka populations, halting slave raids; however, this 
balance of power soon tipped with the arrival of Egyptian forces in the 19th century (Johnson 
2003:2-4). 
 In 1820, the Turco-Egyptian ruler Mohamed Ali launched an invasion of Sudan in 
search of slaves and gold. While Egypt‘s superior firepower allowed Mohamed Ali to press 
further into southern Sudan than was previously possible, the southern swamps limited 
Mohamed Ali‘s ability to impose any form of centralized control over the local populations 
(Collins 1964). Nevertheless, the heavy taxes for slaves imposed on the North by Mohamed 
Ali‘s regime led to a revival of slave raids in the South. Slave raids became so widespread 
that by 1860 between 12,000 and 15,000 southerners were sent north annually to serve as 
slaves (Collins 2008:20)
6
.  Three years later Isma'il Pasha, the Egyptian Viceroy, issued a 
decree to end the slave trade and enlisted the help of ―incorruptible Europeans morally 
committed to end the slave trade...‖ Samuel Baker and Colonel Charles Gordon, both British 
nationals, became influential administrators in Sudan and brought with them an increased 
                                                 
6
  The legacy of slavery is still felt today as the Northern word for Southerner is abd, slave. 
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British presence (Collins 2008: 18). 
 Mohamed Ali‘s dynasty was toppled by the Mahdist revolution in 1885 and placed 
Muhammad Ahmad in power. While southern geography contributed to the success of the 
Mahdist revolution, as the Sudd strained communication between Turco-Egyptian forces 
(Collins 1962:132), it remained out of the Mahdiyya‘s control. The Madhist government was 
short lived as by the 1890s Anglo-Egyptian forces began to reconquer what Egypt lost during 
the Mahdist revolution. Following the Battle of Omdurman in 1898 Sudan found itself under 
Anglo-Egyptian condominium rule which would last until 1947, the British would remain in 
power until 1955. 
 When the British assumed control of Sudan they were faced with administering two 
vastly different regions, the North and South. Accordingly, London pursued distinct policies 
of ―Indirect Rule‖ for the ―two Sudans.‖ In the North, the Anglo-Egyptian government 
―secured itself from any threat of resurgent Mahdism... by reinstating tribal leaders where 
they had been replaced... by supporting orthodoxy against ‗fanaticism…‘ and by subsidizing 
the Mahdiyya's religious rivals...‖ Furthermore, the British were able to bring the North 
under centralized control relatively easily by establishing a police force and dispatching 
civilian British officials in Northern provinces (Johnson 2003:9). Eventually, the British also 
reduced their presence in Sudan, opting to rule through the local elite, the effendia (Collins 
2008:38). The South, however, was more elusive to centralized control, and required a 
different form of rule. 
 The British, like their Turco-Egyptian and Mahdist predecessors, were challenged by 
Southern geography and found themselves unable to effectively rule over the South. 
Overtime, a distinct ―Southern Policy‖ took form, in response to British difficulties in the 
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South and fears of Egyptian and Islamic influence in the region, following Egypt‘s 
independence in 1919. Britain‘s new policy for southern Sudan was one of 
underdevelopment enforced by ―devolution‖ of power to ―tribal leaders,‖ as well as 
opposition to southern urbanization (Tvedt 2004:225). Furthermore, the British believed that 
by encouraging religious diversity in Southern Sudan (Christianity and local religions) they 
could also avoid Northern (Islamic) influence (Johnson 2003). As one might expect, this 
policy of ―Native Administration‖ served to deepen the divide between the North and South 
by establishing clear educational, infrastructural and economic gaps – a key factor in the 
buildup to Sudan‘s Civil Wars.  
 
Independence, Violence, Independence: 
 In a classic case of European decolonization, the British, bound by their appreciation 
of neatly drawn borders, decided that the Northern and Southern Sudan, despite their 
differences, would be granted independence as one nation. Though discussions were 
underway between Northern and Southern politicians to create a federal government, which 
would allow the South to maintain some autonomy, as independence drew nearer it became 
clear that such a state would not exist. This period also witnessed attacks on the North from 
Southern ―mutineers,‖ who were dissatisfied with an increasing presence of Northerners in 
the South as civil servants, signaling the beginning of the First Sudanese Civil War. 
Nevertheless, on January 1st 1956, Sudan became a sovereign country with two very distinct 
regions, which shared little geographic or cultural unity. Both had very different experiences 
with their Anglo-Egyptian colonial administrators in terms of governance and infrastructural 
development, and both had varying levels of religious diversity and education. The 
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government in Khartoum was expected to administer the South, while Southerners were 
expected to adhere to Northern rule. From this point forward the inequalities between the 
North and South became even clearer and eventually gave way to violence. 
 Soon after independence the government of Sudan began a campaign of ―Arabization 
and Islamization in the South,‖ by instituting Arabic as the lingua franca – during the colonial 
era Southerners were taught English – and even shutting down Christian missionary schools 
(Johnson 2003:30-31). In response to attacks of Southern ―mutineers‖ on the North, 
Khartoum increased military efforts against the South hoping to weed out rebels. This 
violence continued to escalate, eventually turning into an all-out civil war between the North 
and South, which would last until 1972, leaving roughly half a million people dead.  
 Though the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement ended the civil war between the Sudanese 
Military and Southern Sudan Liberation Movement, establishing a cease fire between the 
North and South and giving Southern Sudan a greater degree of autonomy, it merely served 
as a temporary fix to the inequalities which started the civil war in the first place. Thus, in 
1983, just over a decade after the 1972 agreement, the Second Sudanese Civil War began. To 
discuss all the reasons that led to a return to violence would be tedious. As Douglas Johnson 
argues, ―religion, local perceptions of race and social status, economic exploitation, and 
colonial and post-colonial interventions are all elements in the Sudan‘s civil war, but none, 
by itself, fully explains it.‖ For the purposes of this paper it is sufficient to know that a war 
did occur and left a trail of destruction in its path.  
 Led by John Garang De Mabior, the South Sudanese once again took up arms against 
the government in Khartoum, under the banner of the Sudan‘s People Liberation Movement 
(SPLM) and Sudan‘s People Liberation Army (SPLA). The war, which lasted until 2005, left 
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between one to two million dead, the majority of whom were civilians. The Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA), brokered by the international community and leaders from both 
Khartoum and the South officially brought the fighting to a halt in 2005 and made provisions 
for the South to hold a referendum in January 2011 to vote on secession from Sudan. The 
stability of the peace agreement was called into question several times, most notably 
following the death of John Garang, whose helicopter crashed following a visit to Uganda 
shortly after the signing of the CPA. Despite spurts of violence between the North and South 
during the interim period, the referendum went ahead as scheduled in January 2011 when the 
South Sudanese voted overwhelmingly for secession from Sudan. 
 On July 9, 2011 South Sudan celebrated its independence with President Salva Kiir, 
also a Dinka and successor of John Garang, at its helm. In the years preceding the 
referendum the international community had become increasingly involved in Sudanese 
politics – due to the promise of oil and its geostrategic location – offering developmental 
assistance and peacekeeping assistance to the South as well as the region conflict ridden 
region of Darfur; however, since Southern independence these efforts have intensified. 
Unprecedented amounts of international aid have flooded into South Sudan, as have the 
development community, who plan to pull the nation out of decades of violence by building a 
strong economy, central government and community organizations, to name but a few 
endeavors – it is here, into the breach of emerging practices, where this paper picks up.  
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Chapter 3: South Sudan and “High Modernist” Planning  
During the Anglo Egyptian Condominium 
„We came,‟ they said, „to a remote region, to immense marches, the outlet from which 
neither the natives knew, not could anyone hope to attain to it, so mingled were the 
grasses with the water, and the water impassable to men traveling either on foot or 
with a boat, seeing that a small kind, holding on person only, was as much as the 
muddy and tangled marsh could sustain. – Seneca, A.D. 55 (Webb 1899:36) 
 
 Since the beginning of the Current Era, foreign powers have been fascinated by 
Southern Sudan‘s swamps, as illustrated by Roman advances in the region. In the absence of 
modern tools and technology, the Romans turned around and for centuries few foreigners 
attempted to traverse the swamps until the arrival of Western travelers in the 1820s. 
Beginning in the 19th century Egyptian officials, British administrators and Western 
travelers, tied to the industrial revolutions‘ ideas of modernist ―progress,‖ formed a discourse 
about southern Sudan that characterized the region‘s hydro-geography as ―dangerous‖ and 
―harmful‖ to outsiders and viewed its water wealth, which could benefit Egypt and northern 
Sudan, as ―wasted‖ on the local populations. The Sudd, swampland in southern Sudan, came 
to be understood as a ―scientific problem‖ by Anglo-Egyptian and (northern) Sudanese 
officials, and soon enough technical solutions were proposed to harness the water ―lost‖ in 
the wetlands. After much trial and error, northern governments, engineers, and scientists 
agreed upon building a canal through South Sudan‘s swamps – the Jonglei Canal. In the 
process of drawing up project schematics Southern livelihoods received little attention as a 
result of the ―high modernist‖ worldview of the Anglo-Egyptians and colonial and Northern 
Sudanese attitudes towards the Southern people– the results, discussed in Chapter 5, were 
disastrous. Prior to examining the construction of an imaginary South Sudan and the 
formulation of the Jonglei Canal, it is imperative to understand the hydro-geography of the 
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region that foreign entities interacted with.  
 
The Nile River  
 Egypt, a largely arid landscape save the fertile narrow strip on the Nile River‘s banks, 
has been commonly known as ―the Gift of the Nile.‖ For thousands of years the river has 
created habitable areas and provided Egypt‘s food security. This is well reflected in 
traditional representations of the Nile. Egyptocentric is the best way to describe the majority 
of Nile scholarship, which tends to focus on the positive effects the river brings to its 
northernmost beneficiary; however, prior to its arrival in Egypt the Nile passes through nine 
other countries.  These riparian nations are often mentioned in passing, mostly to chronicle 
the Nile‘s teleological journey to Egypt‘s fertile soil. Thus, in an effort to move beyond the 
limitations of current Nile scholarship, I will describe the river through the lens of South 
Sudan, its geographical features and how it contributes to local livelihoods. Although Egypt 
will not be absent from this discussion, it will not take precedence over South Sudan. I will 
conclude this section with a brief discussion of the past century of Egyptian dominance over 
the Nile River and show how South Sudan‘s recent independence points towards imminent 
change in water rights in the Nile Basin.  
 The Nile, the longest river in the world, travels more than 4230 miles from its 
headwaters in Burundi and Ethiopia before joining the Mediterranean Sea. Consisting of 
various rivers, the Nile itself isn‘t necessarily one unified body of water. While the Nile River 
has two main tributaries, the White and Blue Niles, only the White Nile passes through South 
Sudan.  
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 Before arriving in South Sudan the White Nile passes through Burundi, Rwanda, 
Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Many sources of the 
White Nile exist, but its southernmost point is located in Burundi. Once the Nile enters South 
Sudan it meets the Bahr al-Ghazal and Bahr al-Jabel tributaries and flows into the Sudd, one 
of the world‘s largest wetlands, which plays a significant role in the lives of the southern 
Sudanese, as detailed in Chapter 2. Yet traditional descriptions of the Nile have often ignored 
these realities. Robert Collins, a renowned historian of Northern and Southern Sudan, who is 
intimately acquainted with the ecology of the South, describes the Sudd as: 
One of the most formidable natural obstacles in the world, the Sudd is a labyrinth of 
11,700 square miles of lakes, lagoons, and meandering channels. The lagoons and 
lakes rise and fall according to the amount of water from the equatorial lakes and 
seasonal rainfall to disgorge floating islands of aquatic plants, sudd, which coalesce 
into dams of aquatic vegetation that force the river to rise and cut a new channel 
around the obstruction, by which the process is repeated, forming new barriers in a 
never-ending cycle. Trapped in this vast expanse of swamp and lagoons enormous 
quantities of water are lost to evaporation and transpiration, so that whatever the 
volume flowing down from the great equatorial lakes or by rainfall the quantity of 
water that emerges from the Sudd remains approximately the same from one year to 
the next and is lost to both Sudan and Egypt. (Collins 2008:2) 
 
Only several pages later does Collins acknowledge the importance of the Sudd in the 
livelihoods of the South Sudanese, a testament to the widespread Egyptocentric discourse on 
the Nile.  
 Moving north, the White Nile leaves the borders of South Sudan and joins the Blue 
Nile at the outskirts of Khartoum. The Blue Nile originates in the highlands of Ethiopia and 
thunders down the mountainside to the plains of Sudan. On its 600 mile journey through 
Ethiopia, the river collects decomposed basalt and rich alluvial soil and silts, turning the 
deserts of Sudan and Egypt into rich agricultural areas (Kendie 1999)
7
. It is this 
                                                 
7
 Since the construction of the Aswan High Dam, these essential salts have been blocked behind the dam's 
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transformative nature of the Nile River that has dictated Egyptian foreign policy for 
centuries. Egypt has relied on the river as its sole guarantor of its food security and potable 
water reserves for thousands of years.  
Historically, upstream conflicts and political instability have allowed Egypt to 
maintain what it deems to be an ‗equitable‘ share of Nile water. In instances when riparian 
nations have been stable enough to pursue construction along the Nile, Egypt has resorted to 
aggressive political maneuvers to hinder or abolish upstream development. Egypt draws 
legitimacy for its claim over the Nile from the 1929 and 1959 Nile Waters Agreements, 
which, in their broadest terms, grant Egypt the power to veto any construction that would 
inhibit the Nile‘s flow. However, Egypt has been unable to maintain its Nile supremacy on its 
own, as the 1959 Agreement extended Nile privileges to neighboring Sudan, following its 
independence in 1956. Although recent years have strained the political alliance between 
Khartoum and Cairo, they have maintained a united front against upstream development. 
This Northern dominance of a shared resource, however, is becoming increasingly 
unsustainable. 
 Population booms throughout the region have required riparian nations to produce 
more food, for more people, at an alarming rate (Swain 2002). Upstream nations will soon be 
required to tap into the Nile reserves to meet this agricultural demand. Great potential exists 
for hydroelectric and irrigation projects upstream (Hassan and Al Rasheedy 2007; Stroh 
2004); however, as a result of Egypt‘s political and military power, further development has 
yet to be implemented. Nevertheless, the recent political developments in Egypt and the 
creation of an independent South Sudan point towards imminent change in the power 
                                                                                                                                                       
massive walls. This had led to the collapse of fisheries in the Nile Delta and erosion to the delta's shoreline 
at a rate of roughly 3 meters per year (de Villiers 2001)  
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structures of the Nile Basin (Boueri 2011).  
 Egypt has recognized the significant changes to the hydropolitical landscape of the 
Nile Basin ushered in by an independent South Sudan. Diplomatic cables released by 
Wikileaks earlier this year state that while ―Egyptian officials have emphasized the 
importance of preserving Sudan‘s unity...they have carefully hedged their bets by maintaining 
close ties to the South‖ (Wikileaks 2009). This translated into political action in the months 
leading up to January‘s referendum, when Cairo allocated $300 million to water and 
electricity projects in South Sudan in July, 2010. Now that the referendum has passed, 
Egyptian efforts to foster a sense of good will between the two nations have intensified. 
 In his first trip since taking office, Egypt‘s Prime Minister, Essam Sharaf, along with 
seven other ministers, traveled to Khartoum and Juba to meet with northern and southern 
Sudanese leaders. During meetings in Khartoum, Egypt‘s foreign minister emphasized his 
country‘s commitment to South Sudan, stating, ―Sudan intends to be the first to recognize 
Juba and Egypt intends to be the second to recognize the south‖ (Al Jazeeera 2011). The 
meetings in Juba further cemented Egypt‘s commitment to South Sudan, where leaders 
discussed reviving the long stalled Jonglei Canal project. Given the canal‘s troubled history, 
it is unlikely that the Government of South Sudan will ever agree to complete the project. 
However, the fact that Egypt is still pursuing a long dead canal is telling and shows the 
ongoing effects of Anglo-Egyptian discourse on Southern Sudan and the persistence of ―high 
modernist‖ worldviews in contemporary Egyptian imaginations of South Sudan. I describe 
these worldviews in the pages that follow.  
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19th and 20th century Anglo-Egyptian Discourse on South Sudan: Background and Primary 
Sources 
 Throughout the 19th century, German, Austrian, English, and even American travelers 
explored the Nile River to locate its southernmost source, which for centuries remained 
unknown. These explorers were motivated by what Frederick Bradnum describes as ―the 
spirit of restlessness which set British gentlemen... walking around the world as if they 
owned it,‖ and by the mystery of the Nile‘s source. In fact, ―By the middle of the nineteenth 
century... [discovering the source of the Nile] had become... the greatest geographical secret 
after the discovery of America...‖ (Warburg 2007). The potential findings of these 
expeditions were of great value to Egypt, as its water security remained unclear. Egyptians 
believed that by pinpointing the source of the Nile some of their hydro-security questions 
such as, would the Nile eventually run out of water and how far South would Egypt have to 
extend its political influence could be answered. While it took decades to locate an agreed 
upon southernmost source of the Nile
8
, explorers soon encountered the Sudd which quickly 
became a bewildering and frustrating terrain for 19th and 20th century Westerners and 
Egyptians alike. Through a close reading of travel narratives and newspaper articles of the 
late 19th and early 20th century we can examine extra-Sudanese discourse regarding the 
Sudd that led to the rise of ―scientific‖ hydrological ―development‖ projects in southern 
Sudan.  
 In my analysis of Anglo-Egyptian discourse on South Sudan I‘ve examined mid to 
                                                 
8
 For an interesting examination of the politics and back and forth between European explorers regarding the 
southernmost source of the Nile, I suggest reading Gabriel Warburg's 2007 article “The Search for the 
Sources of the White Nile and Egyptian-Sudanese Relations.‖  Middle Eastern Studies. 43 (3): 475-486. 
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late 19th and early 20th century Western travel narratives and New York Times articles. 
Through a textual analysis of these primary sources, I show that European and American 
explorers created an imaginary southern Sudan, characterized by its ―dangerous‖ and 
―wasteful‖ swamps – a process which rendered the region‘s ecology invisible. Explorers 
described the vast swamps as impediments to the Nile‘s flow and governed by 19th century 
modernist ideologies regarding nature, these travelers argued that the swamps needed to be 
modified and rearranged, to accommodate extra-Sudanese travel up and down the river. In 
the eyes of British and Egyptian officials, reorganizing the swamps held economic promise. 
With an increased water supply, crops such as cotton could flourish in the barren Egyptian 
deserts and soon enough canal plans were drawn up to ―save‖ water from the Sudd. 
 
Southern Sudan as “dangerous” 
 In 1836, Muhammad Ali, ruler of Egypt and Sudan, consulted European geographers 
regarding the source of the White Nile, believing that its discovery held the promise of gold. 
Three years later, two Frenchmen, Joseph-Pons d'Arnaud and Georges Thibaut, accompanied 
an Egyptian expedition – dispatched by Muhammad Ali – whose mission was to pinpoint the 
source of the White Nile. These travelers, however, ―surrendered to the implacable Sudd near 
the modern town of Bor on 26 January 1840‖ (Collins 2008:13). Upon hearing the news, an 
outraged Muhammad Ali commanded Salim Kaptan, the commander of the previous 
expedition to return to the White Nile the following November. This time, accompanied by 
two Frenchmen and a German, Captain Salim was able to cut through the Sudd revealing  
―flourishing cultivations, and an infinite number of elephants with precious ivory...‖ (Collins 
2008:13-14). In 1848, Ferdinand Werne, the German explorer who joined Salim‘s expedition, 
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published his experiences along the White Nile and the vast riches, in the form of ivory, that 
existed beyond the Sudd (Collins 2008:14). The swamps, however, were not so easily 
malleable, as the vegetation began to reform and expand shortly after Salim‘s initial 
―victory.‖  
 Viewing the Sudd as a ―danger‖ to Egyptian interests Ismai'il Pasha, Muhammad Ali‘s 
grandson and ruler of Egypt and Sudan, sent a massive force of fifteen hundred soldiers, 
commanded by the British explorer Samuel Baker, to permanently eradicate the vegetation 
that so ―hinders‖ the Nile‘s flow. Baker‘s expedition failed; however, the mission itself and 
the imprint it left on Baker (and subsequent Western explorers) is worth investigating.  
 Muhammad Ali‘s decision to send 1,500 soldiers was a Northern declaration of war 
against southern Sudanese land, and this is reflected in most subsequent accounts of northern 
encounters with the swamps. Florence Baker, Samuel‘s wife, who accompanied the 
expedition recounts their experiences in the Sudd as a struggle against a powerful force of 
nature in a letter to her daughter:  ―It would be quite impossible by any description to give 
you an idea of the obstacles to navigation through which we have toiled with the fleet, but 
you can imagine the trouble when you hear that we were thirty two days with 1,500 men in 
accomplishing a distance of only 2½ miles‖ (Baker et al. 1970:80). In the same letter Mrs. 
Baker describes the morale of the ―troops:‖ ―We were broken-hearted on arrival at the 
shallows and the men made up their minds that we must turn back. The river was falling 
rapidly, thus it was a race against time as it might be perfectly dry by the time we should 
have overcome a present obstruction. It appeared that the expedition must be utterly ruined‖ 
(85). This war was not without casualties, as Florence Baker mentions the sinking of ships 
and soldiers perishing from heatstroke – the Sudd had now become ―dangerous‖ to the very 
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lives and boats of the explorers. The journals of Florence and Samuel Baker, however, 
describe their efforts as triumphant over the Sudd – the troops are eventually able to clear a 
way through the swamps and continue on with their southward journey. 
 The Sudd had proven to be a strong adversary to northern expansion, yet European 
explorers continued their assault on the southern swamps. Baker and Muhammad Ali‘s 
efforts to eradicate the vegetable barrier, however, failed; two decades later, Colonel Charles 
Gordon reported: ―I have made inquiries, and find that Baker cut through some 80 miles of 
the ‗Sudd‘ or vegetable barrier; the other day my steamer found this quite closed up.‖ The 
rhetoric of war with nature continued, with Colonel Gordon referring to the thick clumps of 
vegetation as a ―fleet‖ – characterizing the plants as military ships – and furthering 
conceptions of the Sudd as inherently ―dangerous.‖ To quote Col. Gordon‘s account of his 
encounter with the Sudd, entitled ―Cutting Through the Nile:‖  
Last year the Governor went up, and with three companies and two steamers he cut 
large blocks of the vegetation away. At last, one night the water burst the remaining 
part and swept down on the vessels, dragged the steamers down some four miles, and 
cleared the passage. The Governor says the scene was terrible. The hippopotami were 
carried down, screaming and snorting; crocodiles were whirled round and round, and 
the river was covered with dead and dying hippopotami, crocodiles, and fish who had 
been crushed by the mass (New York Times 1881:4, emphasis added
9
). 
 
This depiction of the Sudd as not only a danger to explorers, but also to the environment and 
animals inhabiting the region, became ingrained in northern imaginations of southern 
swamps. Following the failings of Baker‘s initially ―successful‖ passage through the 
swamps, and Col. Gordon‘s account of his travels on the White Nile, the Sudd came to be 
                                                 
9
 As an interesting aside, another description of the same event is catalogued in Alvan S. Southworth's Four 
thousand miles of African travel: a personal record of a journey up the Nile and through the Soudan to the 
confines of Central Africa, embracing a discussion on the  sources of the Nile, and an examination of the 
slave trade. 1875. New York: Baker, Pratt & Co. Ismail Bey, the son of Mohamed Ali, claims that the dead 
hippopotami served as a wonderful meal, which his crewmembers relished. From here we can deduce that 
the rhetoric of the Sudd being a dangerous place was chiefly a European creation.  
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viewed as a ―scientific‖ problem, as brute force had proven ineffective against the vegetation. 
 Nevertheless, Baker‘s methods continued to be used long after he ―conquered‖ the 
Sudd. Fighting the Nile Sudd, an article from Pearson‘s Magazine republished by the New 
York Times on July 28, 1901, details the early methods the British Royal Navy used to strip 
the Sudd of its ―obstructive‖ vegetation. Their violent techniques of ―garden keeping‖ relied 
on brute strength, as well as a labor force of ―750 Soudanese prisoners under the direct order 
of two young officers of the British Royal Navy. Excerpts from one of these officers‘ journals 
go as follows:  
On arriving at a block [of vegetation] we tie up the steamer and set everything on 
fire... Next we put pieces of wood around our section (cut up telegraph poles,) fix a 
wire hawser round the section [of Sudd]... the force jerk which the steamer brings on 
the wire severs the roots of the section underneath from the others – or at least 
sometimes does: that‘s the idea.  
 
Of note is the use of the Royal Navy role in the Sudd, continuing with the theme of 
northerners being at war with the swamps. Furthermore, their actions of setting vegetation on 
fire and the ―force jerk‖ of the steamer ―severing‖ the roots illustrates the inexact nature of 
their methods - ―science‖ was needed to ―tame‖ the Sudd. 
 The effect of Anglo-Egyptian discourse on Northern and Western perceptions of the 
Sudd was profound and long lasting, best captured in a 1930 New York Times article, titled 
―British Heir Reaches Khartoum By Airplane‖: ―The Prince of Wales, looking bronzed and 
fit, stepped from an aircraft here today after a six-hour flight from Malakal across the 
dangerous swamps of Southern Sudan.‖ As demonstrated by the article, decades after Baker‘s 
expedition and the Royal Navy‘s efforts to contain the Sudd the ―dangerous‖ nature of the 
swamps and southern Sudan remained ingrained in the Anglo-Egyptian imagination. While 
early confrontations with the swamps were driven by the ―danger‖ of the swamps – to 
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Egyptian ivory prospects, exploration and the explorers themselves – it eventually took a 
reduced role in persuading Egyptian action against the swamps, as Anglo-Egyptians began to 
assign economic value to the water ―trapped‖ in the Sudd.  
 
Southern Sudan as “wasteful” 
 The early iterations of ―scientific‖ data collection and plans to cure southern Sudan of 
its ―dangerous‖ affliction gave rise to a new discourse on the swamps – one of ―waste.‖ A 
first attempt at ―scientifically‖ solving the Sudd problem was proposed by Sir William 
Willcocks, who suggested planting willows and poplars to reclaim swamp land – a strategy 
which had worked on the Mississippi – on a scale as large as money would permit. He argued 
that if these changes were to be made, the willows would purify the Sudd waters and greatly 
increase Egypt‘s water supply (The Geographical Journal 1900:237-238). Willcocks‘ 
―scientific‖ plan failed (no mentions of its success can be found in later discussions of the 
Sudd) surely due to its misunderstandings of local Sudanese geography – willows were not 
native to southern Sudan for a reason, and their introduction could have both negative 
environmental impacts, or fail entirely. Most importantly Willcocks‘ plan indicated the 
―enormous‖ increase in the Nile‘s flow in the event of successful swamp reclamation. As 
noted in chapter 2, regardless of the water ―lost‖ in the Sudd, the White Nile accounts for 
significantly less water output than the Blue Nile, and would not amount to the ―enormous‖ 
increase Willcocks suggested. 
 Nevertheless, the potential to save an ―enormous‖ volume of water became an 
integral part of Sudd discourse. These estimates of the volume of water saved soon took on a 
life of their own, and began to shape a dire (though false) need for Egyptian access to the 
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―trapped‖ waters in the Sudd. In 1900, a year before Willcocks introduced his willow plan, a 
New York Times article entitled ―Egypt‘s Cotton Prospects,‖ reported that ―The prospects of 
the cotton crop have been improved owing to the progress made in cutting the Sudd, thus 
enabling a greater flow of water‖ (April 3rd, 1900). So entrenched were conceptions of the 
magnitude of water trapped in the Sudd, that people began attributing natural fluctuations in 
agricultural product to swamp clearance. This discourse remained in effect 11 years later, 
when Sir William Willcocks claimed that if the Sudd was successfully ―removed,‖ the White 
Nile‘s discharge would be more than doubled and Egypt‘s habitable area be significantly 
increased (New York Times 1911:C3). The idea that precious waster was ―wasted‖ in the 
Sudd and by extension ―wasted‖ on the people of southern Sudan, gave rise to a large scale 
canal project, the Jonglei Canal (elaborated upon in chapter 4). 
 The image of the Sudd as a highly absorbent sponge inhibiting Egypt‘s agricultural 
and ―habitable area‖ carried on throughout the 20th century, became popular in Sudanese 
government circles, who believed that water could be put to better use in northern Sudan. The 
effect of Nile discourse on government officials in Khartoum was a significant contributor to 
the ―success‖ of the Jonglei Canal scheme. In 1975, three years before digging in Jonglei 
began, Yahya Abdel Mageed, Sudan‘s Minister of Irrigation and Electric Power was quoted 
in the New York Times as saying: ―the amount of water lost in the Sudd is staggering... The 
object of the Jonglei scheme is to squeeze the water that it is holding into the Nile, at the 
same time providing more cultivable land by draining the swamp.‖ The same articles goes on 
to say that when confronted by environmentalist critics, Mageed responded : ―why preserve 
land that is bad? Why don‘t the conservationists ever mention the fact that we will be 
destroying an environment which breeds mosquitoes and makes local people prey to malaria‖ 
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(1975). Had Mageed done his homework on the spread of malaria and hydro-development, 
he would have probably reconsidered his claim. In Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, 
Modernity, Timothy Mitchell (2002) discusses the shocking spread of malaria following the 
construction of the Aswan Low Dam in 1902, showing that the environmental impacts of 
damming the Nile allowed mosquitoes to move up the Nile faster than ever before, and into 
areas that were previously inaccessible to them. Critiques aside, Mageed‘s comments 
highlight the persistence of Anglo-Egyptian discourse on the Sudd – he directly mentions the 
―danger‖ and ―waste‖ of the swamps – and the role that foreign views of Southern hydro-
geography played in building the Jonglei Canal. 
** 
 As discussed in Chapter 2 the Sudd is neither ―dangerous‖ nor ―wasteful‖ to the 
southern Sudanese, and, in fact, has played a formative role in their livelihoods. With this in 
mind two questions arise: how and why were their livelihoods overlooked? An obvious 
answer to both questions would be colonial and Northern Sudanese attitudes towards the 
southern Sudanese people – the benefits of an increased water supply in the North 
outweighed the human costs in southern Sudan. However, by using the theories outlined by 
James Scott in Seeing Like a State we can add another dimension to Anglo-Egyptian neglect 
of southern Sudanese livelihoods. 
  The shift from clearing the Sudd through brute force to clearing it through scientific 
means required legibility; the land needed to be reduced to statistics and maps so that 
engineers, who would probably never set foot in the Jonglei region, could draw up project 
plans. And thus, from the end of World War I until 1948, the Egyptian Irrigation Service 
compiled statistics and data for drawing up plans for the eventual Jonglei Canal. From a 
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Scottian (1998) view, this process served to mask local livelihoods, as qualitative data had no 
place in the over simplified, ―scientific‖ endeavors of Egyptian scientists. 
 Egypt went to great lengths to gather information on the Sudd. ―Two Planes Will 
Survey 20,000 Miles in Sudan‖ reads the headline of a 1930 New York Times piece. The 
article explains that the Irrigation Department of the Egyptian Government commissioned 
two British planes to map the Sudd region (as well as parts of Uganda and Congo). The 
survey was intended as ―a step toward a canalization scheme for the Sudd region... [With] the 
whole area to be mapped on a scale of 1-50,000 and photographic plans...[to be made] on the 
scale of 1-20,000
10.‖ This bird‘s eye view was characteristic of Anglo-Egyptian 
understandings of southern Sudan. To these extra-Sudanese actors the data collected fully 
supported the construction of the canal. Water would be saved, Egypt would increase its 
agricultural output and the world would finally be rid of the ―dangerous‖ Sudd. At the same 
time, this ―view from above‖ effectively diminished the contributions of the Sudd‘s water to 
local livelihoods. Though decades have passed since colonial era planning, I will show in 
Chapter 4 that the ―high modernist‖ and ―techno-scientific‖ worldview problematized by 
Ferguson and Scott, and held by Anglo-Egyptian officials, has re-surfaced in the formative 
stages of development in South Sudan  
                                                 
10
 Interestingly, at around the same time, Egypt was undergoing an intensive mapping project. Cartography 
became such a preoccupation of officials at the time that surveyors produced twenty thousand maps of 
Egypt, done on a scale of 1:2,500 (twenty-five inches per mile). Through this process, Egypt became one of 
the ―...most closely mapped terrains in the world‖ (Mitchell 2002:86). 
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Chapter 4: “History Repeating Itself?:  
Water and “Development” in Sovereign South Sudan 
The Southern half of the Sudan is potentially one of the richest farming regions in the 
world, with the soil, sunlight and water resources to produce enormous quantities of 
food - as much perhaps, as the entire world now produces.' The water is useless 
today; the headwaters of the White Nile, blocked in their northward flow... spill out 
over the land to form great swamps. To unlock the promise of the Southern Sudan 
those swamps would have to be drained, a rural infrastructure put in place, and the 
nomadic cattle raisers of the region somehow turned into sedentary farmers. The 
Capital costs of such an undertaking would be as large as the promise... yet the 
potential is real and untapped, and as world food shortages persist such a reserve can 
no longer be neglected. (Hopper 1976 as cited in De Mabior 1981:113-114). 
  
 Agricultural reform has become a buzzword amongst the GoSS and development 
community in recent years. Recognizing South Sudan‘s finite oil reserves and embracing its 
agro-friendly geography, President Salva Kiir stated at the 2011 UN General Assembly that, 
―The ambition of the people of South Sudan is to be able to transform their country into a 
regional agro-industrial powerhouse.‖ While some projects are underway it is unlikely that 
large scale agricultural reform will occur in the near future – the international community are 
currently more preoccupied with providing humanitarian assistance such as security and 
shelter for the displaced victims of ongoing violence in South Sudan. Nevertheless, the funds 
are ready and the aspirations strong for transforming the country into an ―agro-industrial 
powerhouse.‖ The positive aspects of agricultural reform are clear – many believe that South 
Sudan‘s issues with shaky food security, low national GDP and quality of life can be solved 
by improving current crop outputs and expanding the practice of agriculture to South Sudan‘s 
uncultivated arable land. With an increase in food production, the nation could also benefit 
the food insecure Horn of Africa. Furthermore, the construction of roads and an infrastructure 
to support large-scale agriculture would create thousands of jobs. In the eyes of developers, 
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agricultural development is holistic development extending beyond the farm and into all 
corners of South Sudanese society.  
 This chapter picks up on this thread of agricultural expansion and examines the lack 
of development actor and GoSS consideration of South Sudan‘s water and people and the 
complexities of implementing large scale agriculture in the formative stages of development 
practice. I argue this is a result of the ―development‖ worldview. I begin by introducing two 
powerful actors publicly supporting and funding agricultural projects in South Sudan: the 
development community and private companies. Next, I move to an analysis of twenty-four 
documents, reports and news articles from aid actors involved in South Sudan. Although I 
have chosen to focus on the development community as they have drawn international 
attention to South Sudan and its agricultural potential, interspersed throughout this chapter 
will be some of the views espoused by private investors.  
 In the pages that follow, I will show that international actors have approached South 
Sudan from a top-down point of view, a lens which has obscured local livelihoods, regional 
ecology and the hydro-intensity of agricultural development – to use Scott‘s (1998) 
terminology, the GoSS and international community are ―seeing like a state.‖ Seen is the 
need for agricultural growth to assure a prosperous economic future for South Sudan; unseen 
is the need to restructure the livelihoods of many Southern Sudanese to achieve large scale 
farming. Seen is the agricultural potential of South Sudan‘s fertile land; unseen is the hydro-
intensity of agricultural transformation. This dichotomy between how the development 
community view South Sudan and the human and environmental realities on the ground 
points toward inevitable negative, though unintended, consequences for the new nation. 
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Parties to South Sudanese Agricultural Development: 
 From an economic point of view South Sudan is not harnessing its full agricultural 
capacity. Three powerful actors, equipped with funds and political influence, have emerged 
with hopes to reform South Sudan‘s agriculture: the GoSS (lacking in funds, yet motivated 
by the allure of foreign investment, to transform the nation into an ―agro-industrial 
powerhouse‖), the development community and private interests. These interested parties fall 
into two camps with different motivations behind expanding agriculture in South Sudan. 
While the GoSS and development community are ostensibly working to ensure the prosperity 
of the South Sudanese, foreign investors have, not surprisingly, prioritized their own profits. 
This section will explore the motivations of these parties and show that while their goals 
differ they will achieve them through the same means: agricultural development. 
 The development community and GoSS believe that South Sudan‘s past, present and 
future issues with food security can be solved through agricultural growth. The GoSS and 
development actors have recognized that food aid can only last so long and that eventually 
South Sudan will need to produce its own food without external assistance – they hold that 
agricultural growth is the way to accomplish this (Barber 2011; European Union 2011; 
Norwegian People‘s Aid 2011; The United Nations 2011; USAID 2011). 
 Following Salva Kiir‘s call for agricultural action in South Sudan, the international 
community have mobilized behind the GoSS to enact this change. In December 2011, 
USAID hosted the International Engagement Conference for South Sudan where major 
figures in the development community and South Sudanese and American governments met 
to discuss the nation‘s future. On the first day of meetings, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
addressed the conference and, among other things, highlighted agriculture as a main priority 
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of the United States in South Sudan:  
As we help South Sudan diversify its economy, we are especially focused on 
agriculture. Although its soil is fertile enough to be one of Africa‘s breadbaskets, most 
of South Sudan‘s food is imported. USAID has launched a major set of agricultural 
initiatives to change that—including a groundbreaking effort to provide loans to 
South Sudan‘s farmers. We also seek to partner with the private sector, which can 
provide advanced seeds and other technology that will help South Sudan‘s farmers 
increase their yields (2011).  
 
In her speech, Clinton did not acknowledge the Nile River or water, key environmental 
factors in agricultural growth. The United States, operating through USAID, is one of many 
powerful friends the GoSS has made who support agricultural growth. The European Union, 
United Nations and World Bank all have similar priorities in South Sudan, and smaller 
organizations such as FARM Africa, Oxfam and Mercy Corps have made similar pledges. 
The commitments and funds provided by the GoSS and development community make 
agricultural development seem very likely and the addition of foreign investors points 
towards inevitable reform.  
 Contrary to development organizations which view South Sudan‘s lack of agricultural 
output as a problem, private investment firms are looking upon the country favorably – 
there‘s a lot of profit to be made. South Sudan is rich in natural resources and very fertile 
land. Labor is largely unskilled, as between 50% (Barber 2011; Kaamara 2011) and 90% 
(European Union 2011) of the population live beneath the poverty line
11
, and land is 
inexpensive (or so it would seem). To illustrate the allure of southern Sudanese land, a report 
published by the Norwegian People‘s Aid (NPA) suggests that 9% of South Sudan‘s land 
―has been sought or acquired by private interests‖ (Oakland Institute 2011).  As an 
example of these ―land grabs,‖ in March of 2008 Nile Trade and Development, an American 
                                                 
11
 The inconsistencies between these figures illustrate the anti-scientific nature of development practice.  
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based company, acquired the rights to 600,000 hectares of land (with the possibility of more) 
for 49 years at the price of $25,000. This land tenure deal also granted the company the 
following permissions: ―Right to develop, produce and exploit timber/forestry resources... 
Right to trade and profit...  Right to engage in agricultural activities...Right to explore, 
develop, mine, produce and/or exploit petroleum, Right to sublease any portion or all of the 
leased land‖ (Oakland Institute 2011). The lease agreement also stipulates that the profits 
from the land will be divided between the company and community where the land is 
located, but it remains unclear how the profits will be divided, and whether the local 
population even understand what is going on. A report by the Oakland Institute concludes 
that ―even if the company [Nile Trade and Development] were to invest in a manner that does 
not require resettlement of local communities, such extensive development would still 
significantly affect patterns of land access and use for tens, or even hundreds of thousands of 
people‖ (2011: 2). From this lack of cooperation between local populations and foreign 
investors a larger point regarding international investors and their motivations in South 
Sudan can be drawn.  
 While the profit motives of private investors are not bad in and of themselves and can 
be used to the benefit of both the South Sudanese and investors, the ways in which they have 
framed South Sudan as an opportunity for economic profit are harmful. ―Because it is YOUR 
Land, YOUR Natural Resources,‖ reads the homepage of Jarch Capital, an investment firm 
actively involved in the region. This motto is followed by ―...Jarch combines its knowledge 
of geopolitics, logistics and security in Africa to enhance the value of its assets‖ (Jarch 
Management Group, emphasis added). These quotes suggest that on the surface, Jarch 
actively pursues the benefit of Africans over their own profits – of important note is the 
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emphasis it puts on ―its [own] knowledge‖ rather than local knowledge. However, upon 
further analysis of Jarch itself, it becomes clear that this feigned interest in the benefits of 
private development for the South Sudanese is blatant hypocrisy. On the subject of South 
Sudan, Phil Heilberg, the owner of Jarch Capital, said that: ―I saw the Soviet Union split up... 
Saw it up close. I realized there was a lot of money to be made in breakups, and I vowed that 
the next time I‘d be on the inside‖ (Elamin 2011). Heilberg‘s statement is reminiscent of 
Sudan‘s colonial era; he sees South Sudan‘s independence as an opportunity for economic 
profit, land and people to be exploited, with their benefits a secondary or tertiary 
consideration - a deeper analysis of other ―land grab‖ deals in the region further supports this 
point. Follow up studies on Jarch‘s investments in South Sudan can be instructive for 
scholars interested in post-conflict studies and the intersection of private capital and 
fragmented/coalescing states.  
 Thus, while the private sector and development community differ in their 
motivations, they share the same goal: agricultural growth. However, as my discourse 
analysis will show, local ecology has yet to be considered by these actors, pointing towards a 
poorly planned and potentially harmful approach to agricultural development.  
 
The Documents: 
 In order to examine empirically how the international community have framed South 
Sudan I analyzed a sample of twenty-four documents, reports, and news articles from thirteen 
organizations shown in the table below. As it is hard to disentangle development in South 
Sudan from the region‘s ecology, I chose the documents to represent a wide array of subject 
matter and a range of players in the development community, expecting that the inextricable 
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relationship between water, territory and people would be central, or at least touched upon, in 
the discussion of South Sudan‘s future. To analyze the sample I used the qualitative data 
analysis software, ATLAS TI. I‘ve organized the documents in the table below, with 
corresponding identifying numbers for future referencing:  
Table 1: The Documents 
Document Title Organization Type of 
Organization 
Publication 
Date 
1 - South Sudan Development Plan: 
Medium Term Capacity Development 
Strategy. 4th Draft.  
African 
Development Bank 
International 
Finance 
Institution 
2011 
2 - Getting it Right from the Start: 
Priorities for Action in the New 
Republic of South Sudan. Joint Report.  
Oxfam.  
Co-authored by 39 
organizations.  
NGO 2011 
3 - A Poverty Profile for the Southern 
States of Sudan.  
World Bank International 
Finance 
Institution 
2011 
4 - South Sudan Joint EU/MS 
Programming Document 2011-2013.  
European Union Intergovernmental 
organization 
2011 
5 - Scaling Up Success: FARM Africa‘s 
new strategy for greater impact. Various 
website clippings.  
FARM Africa NGO 2007-2011 
6 - Joint Donor Team Annual Report 
2010.  
Joint Donor Team  Intergovernmental 
organization.  
2011 
7 - Engaging with Africa‘s Newest 
Nation: AfDB in South Sudan. 
African 
Development Bank 
International 
Finance 
Institution  
2011 
8 - South Sudan: A Post-Independence 
Agenda for Action. 
Save the Children  NGO 2011 
9 - Realizing South Sudan‘s Food 
Potential 
Mercy Corps NGO 2011 
10 - South Sudan Agricultural Market 
Investment: Innovative Use of a PPP to 
Build Institutional Capacity Rapidly. 
Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the 
United Nations. 
Intergovernmental 
Organization 
2008 
11 - Multi Donor Trust Fund – South 
Sudan 
World Bank International 
Finance 
Institution 
2011 
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12 - Norwegian People‘s Aid website 
clippings. 
Norwegian People‘s 
Aid 
NGO 2011 
13 - Agriculture Development Program. 
South Sudan Institute: Improving the 
Livelihood of the South Sudan People.  
South Sudan 
Institute 
Think Tank n.d. 
14 - Millenium Development Goals in 
South Sudan. 
United Nations Intergovernmental 
Organization  
n.d. 
15 - Sudan: UN and Partners Work Plan 
2011
12
.  
United Nations  Intergovernmental 
Organization  
2011 
16 - UNDP Southern Sudan Annual 
Work Plan 2011. 
United Nations  Intergovernmental 
Organization  
2011 
17 - UN Outlines Extent of 
Development Challenges Facing South 
Sudan After Independence 
United Nations Intergovernmental 
Organization 
2011 
18 - Promoting the Rule of Law United Nations 
Development 
Program 
Intergovernmental 
Organization 
n.d. 
19 - Community Security and 
Stabilization 
United Nations 
Development 
Program 
Intergovernmental 
Organization 
n.d. 
20 - Building Human Capacity: 
Building Strong Institutions 
United Nations 
Development 
Program 
Intergovernmental 
Organization  
n.d. 
21 - USAID Press Release: USAID 
Funds Program to Reduce Food 
Insecurity in South Sudan 
USAID U.S. 
Governmental 
Agency 
2011 
22 - South Sudan Transition Strategy 
2011-2013 
USAID U.S. 
Governmental 
Agency 
2011 
23 - Sudan – Complex Emergency: Key 
Developments Fact Sheet 6 
USAID  U.S. 
Governmental 
Agency  
2011 
24 - Sudan – Complex Emergency: Key 
Developments Fact Sheet 7 
USAID  U.S. 
Governmental 
Agency  
2011 
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 While this document discussed Sudan, as a whole, prior to secession, I only used the sections pertaining to 
Southern Sudan, which were conveniently separated from discussions regarding Northern Sudan.  
50 
 
  
The Findings:  
 On the whole my analysis shows that approaches to development differ depending on 
the type of institution in question. As per the documents, international finance institutions 
like the World Bank and governmental and intergovernmental agencies such as USAID and 
the UN have viewed development in South Sudan from a state-centric perspective, 
emphasizing the importance of training government officials, decentralizing government, 
strengthening the police force, and bolstering the national economy. On the other hand, 
NGOs like Oxfam, Save the Children, Norwegian People‘s Aid and FARM Africa have paid 
more attention to grass roots development. For example, ―Getting it Right from the Start,‖ 
the Oxfam report, co-signed by 25 other NGOs outlines 10 recommendations for ―action‖ in 
South Sudan. Among them are ―involve communities and strengthen civil society,‖ ―promote 
pro-poor, sustainable livelihoods,‖ and ―strengthen government capacity, from the bottom 
up.‖ However, the state-centric perspective privileged by the World Bank and UN is not 
entirely done away with. Supporting the GoSS remains a top priority of the Oxfam report‘s 
signatory NGOs (Document #2). Despite their differences in approach the end goals of the 
development community in South Sudan are the same: bettering the lives of the South 
Sudanese and ensuring future prosperity of the young nation. What development actors have 
reached broad agreement on are the challenges the people and government of South Sudan 
currently face.  
 South Sudan is in what development organizations have termed a state of ―chronic 
underdevelopment, acutely vulnerable to recurring conflict and climatic shocks‖ (Document 
#2).  Statistics support these claims: only 20% of the population have access to basic health 
care, an  infant mortality rate of 102 per 1000 live births, 73% illiteracy, 50% of Southern 
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Sudanese are food insecure, and 90% of the population live beneath the poverty line 
(Document #4). These numbers and statistics, however, can only provide a partial and limited 
view of the realities in South Sudan. As discussed by Ferguson (1990) and Scott (1998) 
―development‖ engineers approach countries from a technical point of view and in the 
process overlook country-specific environmental and human conditions that must be 
recognized for development to be successful. This technical bias can be seen in contemporary 
discourse through systematic analysis of the language used to discuss South Sudan. I have 
divided this examination into two parts. First, I will provide an overview of how the 
development community as a whole are framing and thinking about South Sudan through an 
analysis of the most frequently used words in my sample. In doing so I show that the 
development community has approached South Sudan through a technical and macro lens, 
illustrating the continuity of the development worldview critiqued by Ferguson (1990). 
Through this method of analysis I also show that development organizations have remained 
silent on the importance of water in South Sudan‘s future. Second, I focus on their treatment 
of people, agriculture, water and land, by documenting how they discussed these specific 
subjects through an analysis of the language used by development actors. I recognize that an 
analysis of these documents is imperfect and may very well not reflect realities in a few 
months from this writing; however, at present they are the only tools we have to grasp yet 
emergent themes.  
 Thus, to begin I show the forty most frequently occurring words (out of a total 8350 
usable words)
13
 in the documents I‘ve analyzed, arranged in the table below: 
 
                                                 
13
 I have removed words I do not consider significant to my analysis, most notably conjunctions, prepositions 
and the names of specific development organizations 
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Table 2: Word Frequency Chart 
Frequency Ranking Word Total Occurrences 
1 South/Southern 1487 
2 Sudan 1400 
3 Development 1044 
4 Support 560 
5 Capacity 558 
6 Government 456 
7 Areas 398 
8 GoSS 396 
9 State 390 
10 Health 388 
11 Population 385 
12 Services 352 
13 Project 351 
14 Humanitarian 339 
15 Sector 338 
16 Security 338 
17 Food 336 
18 Assistance 328 
19 Management 303 
20 Strategy 295 
21 Education 283 
22 International 276 
23 Partners 271 
24 States 270 
25 National 267 
26 Agriculture/Agricultural 267 
27 Local 262 
28 Access 258 
28 Water 258 
30 Conflict 253 
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31 Training 238 
32 Ministry 235 
33 Needs 235 
34 Activities 233 
34 Economic 233 
34 Poverty 233 
37 Children 232 
38 Provide 230 
39 Million 218 
40 Work 203 
 
 As documented above, the technical language that Ferguson found in Lesotho is well 
documented in the way the aid actors are talking about South Sudan; the local specifics of the 
country have been ignored in favor of macro terminology that any development scientist can 
understand. For example, ―supporting‖ (#4) and ―providing‖ (#38) ―assistance‖ (#18) to the 
―government‖ (#6) of South Sudan (GoSS [#8]) is a main concern in contemporary 
discourse. Health (#10), food (#17), security (#15), poverty (#34), and children (#37) are all 
priorities for the development community. Thus, the word frequency chart reveals that the 
local realities of South Sudan have been replaced by universal development strategies. 
Turning to the question of agriculture (#26) and water (#28), one may initially remark that 
the development community has recognized the intimate relationship between hydro and 
agricultural development. Upon closer analysis, however, the opposite becomes stunningly 
clear. Of the 258 occurrences of the term ―water‖ all but two returns dealt with issues of 
sanitation and providing clean drinking water for the South Sudanese. In the pages that 
follow I will examine the ways in which the development actors have overlooked and under 
discussed the livelihoods of local populations as well as the role of water in agricultural 
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development, gross oversights which may hold negative ramifications for soon to be affected 
populations.  
** 
 It is not a random coincidence that population (#11) occurs well before people (#41) 
in the sample I‘ve reviewed. As mentioned in Chapter 2, South Sudan is home to more than 
200 ethnic groups; however, in my analysis I have found specific ethnic groups to be largely 
absent from the development discussion. In the documents I have reviewed the terms 
ethnic/ethnicity and tribal/tribalism occurred a mere eleven times each; narrowing the search 
to individual names of ethnic groups returned no results. This raises the question, where are 
the people of South Sudan? To answer this question, we can turn to Ferguson (1990) and 
Scott (1998). The absence is not surprising – coming up with a standardized development 
project for South Sudan is far easier and more understandable to development technicians; 
however, as mentioned above, the South Sudanese haven‘t been left out entirely. By 
examining the ways the development community has discussed ethnicity and tribalism, 
another question can be asked, how have the people of South Sudan been viewed by the 
development community? Two illustrative examples of developer engagement with ethnicity, 
provide insight: ―Conflict continues among the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), armed 
opposition factions, militias, and ethnic groups. Insecurity, access restrictions, and 
bureaucratic impediments compromise the ability of relief agencies to respond to 
humanitarian and recovery needs,‖ states the USAID Transition Strategy for South Sudan, 
2011-2013 (Document #22). A Save the Children report entitled, ―A Post-Independence 
Agenda for Action,‖ describes South Sudan in a similar fashion: 
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The country has more than 52 tribes, with complex relationships and often a history 
of mutual distrust and suspicion. Perceived inequality in access to political, social and 
economic opportunities feeds these rivalries, with tribalism often being used as a 
‗political tool‘. There is a particular risk of young men taking up arms along tribal 
lines or joining militias. They have grown up during years of violent conflict and now 
face an uncertain future (Document #8). 
 
These quotes are suggestive of a problematic dynamic. When the people of South Sudan are 
visible at all, they are framed as a problem to be managed, a ―danger‖ – reminiscent of 
Anglo-Egyptian desires to control nature and the hydro-geography of the South itself – and 
not as a stakeholder in the nation‘s future. If the development community continues with this 
trend it is unlikely that they are positioned to appreciate and account for the complex 
interactions between people and the environment that have sustained the inhabitants of South 
Sudan for centuries.  
 Along with the effacing of Southern Sudanese people from the development 
landscape in South Sudan there has been a glaring gap between how the development 
community understand agricultural growth as a tool for economic prosperity and the way the 
South Sudanese have traditionally practiced agriculture. In a Mercy Corps report entitled 
―Realizing South Sudan‘s Food Potential,‖ the organization demonstrates its clear 
misunderstanding of South Sudan: ―Decades of civil war have left many with only the 
knowledge for subsistence farming... [this] lack of agricultural knowledge was highlighted by 
the fact that very little purchasing actually took place, despite a wide range of seeds and tools 
being available. Many participants were wary of investing their limited resources into seeds 
and tools that they did not know how to utilize‖ (Mercy Corps 2011). Mercy Corps‘ report 
negatively connotes ―subsistence farming‖ suggesting that this practice is a ―waste‖ of 
potential economic profit. Another such example of foreign entities privileging Western 
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farming techniques is articulated by Jarch Capital. On their website they state: 
 Currently, Jarch is commencing its agribusiness activities in Southern Sudan which 
 has some of the most fertile soil on earth. Jarch has the unique opportunity to lease 
 vast tracts of prime farmland and implement modern farming techniques to enable 
 sustainable food production to address significant local unmet market demand and 
 solve regional food insecurity (Jarch Management Group). 
 
As Scott (1976) reveals in The moral economy of the peasant, these views of agriculture are 
not necessarily applicable in South Sudan, as profit is not the primary objective of rural 
farming. A capitalistic approach to agriculture requires taking risks which doesn‘t necessarily 
guarantee food security. Thus, in peasant societies , farmers often minimize risks to their food 
security, for example, by diversifying crops (1976). Considering the recent instability of food 
security in South Sudan, it is not surprising that the southern Sudanese may avoid taking 
risks to ensure a large enough crop to feed themselves; however, this consideration has been 
unintentionally ignored as a result of the discourse on the benefits of agricultural growth – 
economic and food security.  
 Returning to the Mercy Corps article, one must problematize this notion of a ―lack of 
agricultural knowledge‖ behind limited investment in tools and seeds, an issue which is not 
new in the scholarly literature on Sudan. Over twenty years have passed since the first 
publication of Alex De Waal‘s Famine that Kills: Darfur, Sudan; however, his findings 
remain salient to this day – a testament to the ahistorical and aregional worldview of 
development actors. In his book, De Waal examines the delivery of food aid during Darfur‘s 
famine of 1984-1985. De Waal describes relief agencies as ―disaster tourists,‖ who enter 
poverty-stricken countries to raise international alarms and funds without an understanding 
of local contexts. They propose short-sighted fixes to problems such as the introduction of 
new farming technology and delivering food aid, which De Waal shows don‘t necessarily 
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deliver as much positive change as relief agencies expect. In the case of Darfur‘s famine, De 
Waal documents the unsuccessful impact of delivering seeds to Sudanese farmers: ―the 
problem is that Darfur has a varied ecology and farmers use a variety of strains of millet and 
sorghum. Farmers in some villages use particular strains which are rarely found elsewhere. A 
uniform distribution of one or two types of seed throughout Darfur would do little good‖ 
(219-200). With this in mind we can view the lack of investment in tools and seeds by South 
Sudanese farmers not as a result of lacking agricultural knowledge, but rather due to a 
complex and time tested understanding of their local environment. Returning to Darfur‘s 
famine, De Waal argues that food aid did not save as many lives as expected; long-term 
indigenous survival skills did, and had relief agencies focused on providing ―clean water, 
better sanitation, and measles vaccination, most if not all of the famine deaths could have 
been prevented‖ (2005:8). Here the development community in South Sudan are open to 
more critique. While South Sudan‘s food security may be compromised, by clinging to food 
aid and ―reforming‖ farming practices the relief agencies may be prolonging problems or 
even introducing new ones, rather than effectively addressing them. Unfortunately, the 
discourse on agricultural growth has spread its roots deep and, at this point in development 
practice, major transformation of farming practices seems likely. 
 To fully grapple with the complexity at hand it is necessary to understand how the 
development community view agriculture in South Sudan. Considering that when combined 
the words ―agriculture‖ and ―agricultural‖ were the 26th most frequently used term in the 
documents I‘ve analyzed, it is clear that agriculture is an important feature of development in 
South Sudan. Thus, during my document analysis I catalogued the various ways in which 
―agriculture‖ and ―agricultural‖ appeared in the chart below. As it would be impossible to 
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document each time these terms were used, I have indicated which organizations have 
prioritized agricultural development with corresponding document numbers: 
Table 3: Ways Agriculture is Discussed 
Ways the Development Community 
Talk about Agriculture 
Tool for economic growth and food security:  
Oxfam (2); The European Union (4); Norwegian 
People‘s Aid (12); United Nation (15); USAID (21, 22) 
In Relation to Land Use:  
Oxfam (2); European Union (4); United Nations (17); 
USAID (22) 
South Sudan‘s Wasted Agricultural Potential:  
African Development Bank (7); Save the Children (8); 
United Nations (15); USAID (22) 
In Relation to Water Use:  
The European Union (4) 
  
 As shown above, the development community is actively discussing three features of 
agricultural reform – its use as a tool for economic growth and providing food security; its 
relationship to South Sudanese land; and the wasted agricultural potential of the South (the 
last two are often conflated). On the other hand, they have remained largely silent on the 
relationship between water and agriculture. This analysis provides evidence to support my 
point that the development community is not attending to the necessity of hydro-development 
in South Sudan if large scale agricultural reform is to be implemented (De Mabior 1980). By 
sequestering water, land and people to their own respective categories, if discussed at all, the 
development community has demonstrated their clear misunderstanding of South Sudan as a 
result of modernist biases. Thus, before discussing the consequences of agricultural 
expansion, I will illustrate the supposed benefits of agricultural development through select 
representative quotes from the sampled documents.  
 According to the African Development Bank‘s ―South Sudan Development Plan: 
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Medium Term Capacity Development Strategy, 4th Draft:‖ ―Many have described the 
country‘s prevailing high poverty levels – over 52 percent of South Sudan‘s population live 
below the poverty line – to recurrent wars and strife, which prevented productive, large-scale 
tillage of agricultural land‖ (Document #1). This quote embodies much of the discussion on 
the potential for South Sudan‘s agriculture as it: 1) attributes the nation‘s poverty to a lack of 
agricultural practice; and 2) suggests that ―large-scale tillage‖ of South Sudanese land is a 
given in the absence of ―wars and strife.‖ This popular view of agricultural development is 
furthered by USAID‘s ―South Sudan Transition Strategy 2011-2013,‖ which states that, 
―Agricultural development is viewed as the engine that will not only allow South Sudan to 
diversify its economy away from oil dependence, but also to directly reduce poverty and food 
insecurity‖ (Document #22:10, emphasis added). It seems as though the African 
Development Bank and USAID, two major players in South Sudan‘s future, understand 
agricultural development as a cure all to South Sudan‘s poverty and food insecurity. 
Furthermore, USAID‘s use of the word ―engine‖ draws parallels with Salva Kiir‘s vision of 
South Sudan as an ―agro-industrial powerhouse.‖ These mechanical descriptions of South 
Sudan suggest that if adequately ―developed‖ the nation could serve as a factory for regional 
food production; however, the documents suggest that, as it stands, this assembly line is 
running too slow, with not enough outputs.  
 South Sudan‘s virgin, fertile land has been the subject of much discussion amongst 
the development community, who believe its agricultural potential remains untapped. 
According to the European Union, ―While 47% of the population of South Sudan is food 
deprived, only 4% of arable land is cultivated and total livestock and fish production are 20% 
and 10% of their respective potential‖ (Document #4:8) USAID, on the other hand, provides 
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a different number on the country‘s uncultivated land: ―South Sudan has a land area greater 
than that of France, 90 percent of which is arable, yet only 10 percent is currently under 
cultivation.‖ To illustrate the fertility of South Sudanese land, the USAID report goes on to 
says that ―the potential for agricultural growth is tremendous, with more than 80 percent of 
its land classified as having a length of growing period equal to or more than 180 days, 
indicating sufficient moisture and temperature conditions to support crop growth conditions, 
even under rain-fed conditions‖ (Document #22). Despite these differences in percentage 
(EU listed 4% of land cultivated, while USAID listed 10%), the sentiment remains the same: 
South Sudan‘s land is arable, yet virtually untapped. Oxfam‘s ―Getting it Right from the 
Start: Priorities for Action in the New Republic of South Sudan‖ comments on this ―lack‖ of 
farming practice: ―Despite the richness of South Sudan‘s natural resource base, the vast 
majority of the population relies primarily on subsistence agro/pastoralism‖ (Document #2). 
This document espouses the view that the ―subsistence agro/pastoral‖ livelihoods of the 
South Sudanese are to blame for the lack of larger agricultural practices, yet lost is the fact 
that, as documented by Evans-Pritchard (1940), the lives of transhumant populations in South 
Sudan are intimately tied to the environmental conditions created by the Nile River, its 
tributaries, and the land they inhabit. As a result of the development worldview which 
understands its practice as scientific and universal, the realities of South Sudan have been 
lost, most notably the necessity of large-scale hydro-projects to tap into the country‘s 
agricultural potential, expanded upon below. This lack of attention to water is consistent with 
past development practice, as highlighted in John Garang De Mabior doctoral thesis (1980).  
 During the 1970s, the fertile land of Southern Sudan fell under the world‘s eye as the 
government of Sudan sought to establish itself as a regional agricultural power. Sudan came 
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to be described as the ―‗Breadbasket of the Middle East,‘ a ‗Granary of the world,‘ and a 
‗land of tomorrow.‘‖ During this time, as plans for the Jonglei Canal were being finalized, 
the Government of Sudan turned its eyes to ―the long-neglected rich agricultural potential of 
Sudan‘s Southern Autonomous Region‖ (De Mabior 1980:2). It was expected that on top of 
providing Egypt and Sudan with an increased water supply, the canal‘s construction would 
curb the flooding which challenged large scale farming in the South. As highlighted in the 
quote that began this chapter, David Hopper argued that if the Southern swamps were drained 
South Sudan could produce ―enormous amounts of food – as much perhaps, as the entire 
world now produces‖ (De Mabior 1980:113-114). Hopper was not alone in this belief, as  ―A 
visiting Canadian economic mission was so impressed with Sudan‘s potential that it reached 
the astounding conclusion that, if well organized, the Sudan [could] feed one-third of the 
world‘s population‖ (De Mabior 1980:1, emphasis added). These quotes illustrate South 
Sudan‘s impressive agricultural potential. At the same time, the inconsistencies between 
Hopper‘s and the Canadian estimates of potential food production highlight the inexact 
―science‖ behind their findings, a symptom of their worldview of development. Most 
importantly, they emphasize the necessity of ―reorganizing‖ South Sudan to accommodate 
agricultural growth.  
 At the time of De Mabior‘s research two approaches to developing agriculture 
existed, the ―improvement approach,‖ which ―[emphasized] the modernization of the present 
traditional subsistence agriculture,‖ and the ―transformation approach‖ which sought to 
―transform traditional subsistence agriculture through mechanized or semi-mechanized 
modern agricultural schemes comparable in scope to those of North-central and North-
eastern Sudan... [and] embraces from the onset commercial agricultural production with a 
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large export potential‖ (1980:3-4). De Mabior goes on to say that: 
Sudden and disruptive change in the ―Dinka, Nuer or Shilluk way of life‖ is seen by 
advocates of this [transformation] strategy as a necessary and inevitable aspect of 
socio-economic development and national integration of the area. The problem for the 
inhabitants of the JPA does not lie in the avoidance of sudden and disruptive change, 
but rather shaping and coping with such change. (1980:4) 
 
In the case of contemporary South Sudan, with development actors, the GoSS and private 
investors pushing for ―agro-industry,‖ one can anticipate characteristics of the transformation 
approach in coming years. De Mabior found that in order to make large scale modern 
agriculture viable in the Jonglei area ten conditions would have to be met. Of particular 
interest for this study are his following recommendations:  
1) [The] Development of drainage and irrigation, since it is unlikely that any rural 
development strategy implemented in the JPA can result in significant development 
unless the physical disincentives to farming caused by the frequent dangers to crops 
from floods and droughts are removed or drastically reduced.... 4) [The] Introduction 
of new forms of tenure and firm organization consistent with demands of modern 
sustained production, but not disruptive of traditional society in a major way... 5) 
[The] Spatial reorganization of the countryside into more compact villages than the 
present dispersed pattern of homesteads and farm plots... 9) [And] Self-reliance and 
efficient use of local resources including abolition of or extensive modification in the 
annual transhumance. (1980:215-216) 
 
In regards to the first recommendation, De Mabior argued that although the primary 
beneficiaries of the Jonglei Canal were Egypt and Northern Sudan, its completion would 
―[provide the] necessary conditions for drainage and irrigation without which modern 
commercial agriculture cannot be viable in the [Jonglei] area‖ (1980:43). Thus, as argued 
throughout this thesis, transforming South Sudan into a functional ―agro-industrial‖ machine 
will require the construction of intensive hydro-projects. Furthermore, De Mabior also points 
out that successful large scale farming would necessitate drastic changes in Southern 
Sudanese livelihoods. The realities of environmental and social reorganization as a byproduct 
of agricultural transformation couldn‘t be clearer.  
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 Although three decades have passed since De Mabior published his thesis, his 
findings remain consistent with today‘s environmental conditions in South Sudan, as floods 
will pose a serious challenge to agricultural growth. On September 18th 2011, South Sudan‘s 
minister of agriculture indicated that the annual harvest would be lower than expected as 
flooding in Jonglei State had submerged about 4,000 hectares of crop land (Actually 2011). 
This is not an uncommon occurrence. For thousands of years flooding has disturbed 
sedentary agriculture in South Sudan and the widespread practice of transhumance developed 
as an adaptive strategy to these environmental extremes. If the GoSS, international 
community, and foreign investors do indeed plan to turn South Sudan into an ―agro-industrial 
powerhouse,‖ flooding will be of primary concern. To base an economy (and business) on 
agriculture requires predictable crop returns, currently an impossibility in South Sudan, yet 
the beginnings of hydro-development are beginning to take shape in South Sudan.   
 On September 23rd, 2011 South Sudan‘s Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation, 
the Hon Paul Mayom Akec announced that the GoSS would begin constructing a dam outside 
the northwestern city of Wau. Upon completion, the dam will be used to irrigate nearby farm 
land as well as generate hydropower. Egypt has endorsed the dam project as part of its 
attempts to foster a strong hydro-political alliance with South Sudan and since 2010 has sent 
Egyptian engineers and surveyors to draw up dam plans and assess the economic and social 
ramifications of its construction (Egypt State Information Service 2010). No further 
information is currently available on the dam; however, a report from the 2008 conference 
―Water for Agriculture and Energy in Africa: the Challenges of Climate Change‖ suggests 
that the dam at Wau is one of three dams planned in South Sudan, with two others anticipated 
at Juba and Tori – construction dates are set for 2015. These dams will undoubtedly pale in 
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comparison to larger projects in the region; however, they may change environmental 
conditions and livelihoods of local populations.  
 As mentioned, De Mabior also stipulated that agro-industry in South Sudan would 
also require a significant reorganization of local livelihoods. Recent events in Western 
Equatoria state suggest that the GoSS is beginning to implement such change. On April 27
th
, 
2012 John Kuze, the commissioner of Yambio county ―urged all the citizens to take 
agriculture seriously as he further warned that strong measures may be taken against those 
who may not stand by the policies the government is taking to improve the livelihoods of the 
population in the State‖ (Nashion 2012). Are we seeing the beginnings of the GoSS imposing 
certain livelihoods upon its people? In Western Equatoria the Azande have practiced 
agriculture for centuries, however, they have never been forced to do so. If compulsory 
agriculture is being advocated for by the GoSS, what does this mean for other parts of South 
Sudan where agriculture has not been traditionally practiced? Will the Nuer, Dinka, and 
Shilluk living in one of South Sudan‘s most fertile regions eventually be forced to take up 
agriculture and forsake transhumance? Only time will tell, yet the beginnings of agricultural 
development in South Sudan are cause for alarm.  
 Evidenced by the silence on South Sudanese livelihoods and water, the magnitude of 
agricultural growth has yet to be thoroughly discussed by development actors on an 
institutional level. These gaps in knowledge, caused by the technical worldviews of 
development actors, may very well result in implementing organizations not being able to 
effectively respond to issues of changing livelihoods and resettlement effectively, if at all. 
Given these possibilities, an examination of Sudan‘s experiences with resettlement, as a 
result large dams and canals, can help us anticipate what may be in store for the South 
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Sudanese. 
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Chapter 5: Dams, Canals, and Resettlement:  
What Can Be Learned from Sudan’s Past? 
 
 Hydro-intensive agricultural development in South Sudan is imminent considering the 
motivations of the GoSS and funds of the aid community and private investors. Given that 
poorly planned and executed hydro-projects and the accompanying resettlement initiatives 
can produce disastrous effects for local populations, the development community in South 
Sudan must undertake agricultural growth with caution. In what follows, I show the potential 
consequences of hydro-development through an analysis of the Jonglei Canal and Aswan 
High Dam, large hydro-projects which had disastrous implications for affected populations in 
Sudan. I also examine how such failures can be averted by summarizing the World 
Commission on Dams report (WCD) which contains policy guidelines to improve the 
outcomes of future hydro-projects. However, I will show that the suggestions put forth by the 
WCD have yet to translate into improved development practice, as a result of the inability of 
development organizations and States to move beyond the century old ―technical‖ and 
―universal‖ development paradigm. 
 This chapter begins with an overview of development-forced displacement and 
resettlement (DFDR), a growing field of inquiry amongst anthropologists. Over the past fifty 
years the construction dams has displaced tens of millions of people. More recently, 
according to Thayer Scudder, special economic zones and plantations have become the 
leading cause of forced migration (personal communication, April 2
nd
, 2011). In South Sudan 
where hydro-development and large farming operations are both likely an understanding of 
DFDR is of particular importance. I first examine why resettlement initiatives most often fail 
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their intended goals of improving the lives of displaced persons and what can be expected for 
affected populations during the resettlement process. I then move into a discussion of 
Sudan‘s past experiences with ecologically disruptive events through the case studies of the 
Jonglei Canal and Aswan High Dam, in order to illustrate the possible negative repercussions 
of poorly planned, if ostensibly well-intentioned, resettlement programs. Both of these cases 
provide a useful and productive framework to view the human cost of hydro-projects, 
specifically in the case of South Sudan, as both severely disrupted the lives of local 
populations, one nomadic and the other settled. This attention to modes of livelihood is 
deliberate, as the South Sudanese population is not monolithic and agricultural development 
may affect groups in different ways. I‘ve organized my analysis of the Jonglei Canal and 
Aswan High Dam into three sections. I first discuss the projects themselves and the outcomes 
for the resettled populations – in the case of Jonglei, there was no resettlement program, and 
thus I examine the local repercussions of the canal‘s construction. Second, I ask what went 
wrong, looking specifically at the planning and resettlement stages of each project. Lastly, I 
look at what can be learned from these specific case studies in the construction of new dams 
and irrigation projects in South Sudan. Despite the fact that hydro-development in South 
Sudan will occur on a much smaller scale than the Jonglei Canal and Aswan High Dam, 
disruption of livelihoods and forced displacement are inevitable. Thus, these earlier projects 
are instructive regarding the possible repercussions of forced displacement as the GoSS, 
international aid community, and private investors pursue hydrological and agricultural 
development. 
 The concluding section of this chapter will focus on the ways the GoSS, development 
actors, and foreign companies can avoid repeating the harmful effects produced by the 
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Jonglei Canal and Aswan High Dam through an examination of the World Commission on 
Dams report; however, I will show that since the WCD‘s publication twelve years ago, 
development practice has yet to see substantial change due the worldview of development 
actors, both State and non-governmental. 
 
Development-Forced Displacement and Resettlement: Success and Failure 
 Regardless of where infrastructural development occurs the displacement of 
communities is an oft seen side-effect. Road building, factory construction and dam projects 
are but a few development initiatives that may physically displace and disrupt people‘s lives. 
The majority of development financed projects where DFDR occurs have been a result of 
dam construction – it is estimated that between ―forty and eighty million people [have] been 
relocated in connection to forty-five thousand large dams located around the world‖ (Scudder 
2009: 26). While from a state-level economic perspective these dams may have been 
beneficial, the large majority led to a significant reduction in living standards for the 
displaced. As documented in Scudder‘s recent fifty dam survey, in only three cases did living 
standards improve and only five witnessed a return to previous standards (Scudder 2005). It 
is clear that dam induced displacement has been largely unsuccessful in positively affecting 
the lives of the displaced. Before discussing why DFDR has produced failure, I will discuss 
what constitutes successful and unsuccessful resettlement initiatives.  
 In this chapter, I define ―successful‖ resettlement as one in which the displaced 
population experiences either an increase in living standards, or at least a return to previous 
living conditions. The resettlement theories of Scudder (2009) and Cernea (2000) are 
particularly helpful when assessing the successes and failures of DFDR. Scudder‘s four-stage 
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model of resettlement draws on the few cases of DFDR where a ―favorable‖ outcome was 
achieved. Central to his theory is the role of resettlers in producing ―success.‖ Scudder has 
identified four key stages in the resettlement process: 1) the planning stage; 2) adjustment 
and coping; 3) community formation and economic development; and 4) handing over and 
incorporation (Scudder 2005). Scudder has noted that the first two stages are the most 
challenging for resettlers. During the planning stage of ―successful‖ resettlement initiatives, 
Scudder found that, among other things, the affected populations were actively involved in 
the planning process and that the organization in charge of relocation stressed the benefits of 
resettlement, rather than highlighting loss and compensation  
 The second stage, adjustment and coping, deals with the resettlement process itself, 
the physical displacement of affected populations from their homes to new settlement areas. 
During this period Scudder has found a sudden drop in living standards occurs, followed by 
risk averse behavior on the part of resettlers, which may last for several years.  
 Once the third stage begins, community formation and economic development, 
Scudder has documented a change in resettler behavior from ―a risk-averse stance to a risk-
taking stance that eventually characterizes the majority. At the same time wealth differentials 
increase, as does social stratification‖ (Scudder 2005:36). In order for these changes to occur 
two conditions must be met. ―The first requires resettlers to change their behavior radically. 
The second requires development opportunities... into which settler initiative can be 
channeled and appropriate infrastructure, such as feeder roads and service and marketing 
centers‖ (Scudder 2005:37). If these conditions are not met, stage 3 may result in increasing 
impoverishment, as witnessed in the case of the Kariba Dam.  
 The fourth stage, handing over and incorporation, brings the relocation process to its 
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end as the second generation of resettlers are integrated into the national political economy. 
In order for this goal to be met three conditions must be satisfied. First, the project agency 
must hand over the administration of the community to ―settler institutions; to line ministries 
dealing with agriculture, education, public health and other routine government 
responsibilities; to the private sector; and to NGOs.‖ Second, the living standards of the 
resettled community must ―continue to improve at least in line with improvements in 
neighboring areas.‖ Lastly, the second generation must have the necessary institutional and 
political capabilities to ―compete for their fair share of national resources‖ (Scudder 
2005:40); however, it is rare for resettled communities to reach Stage 4. While Scudder‘s 
theory is a useful tool for examining the role of the resettlers themselves in the relocation 
process, he concedes that it does not do a good job of explaining ―the ‗backsliding‘ that 
occurs when an initial period of community and economic development associated with 
Stage 3 is not sustainable...‖ (Scudder 2005:48). Therefore, Scudder proposes merging his 
theory of resettlement with Cernea‘s impoverishment risks and reconstruction model.  
 Following an analysis of failed resettlement case studies, Michael Cernea was able to 
identify eight risks experienced by resettled populations: ―landlessness, joblessness, 
homelessness, marginalization (involving downward mobility), increased morbidity and 
mortality, food insecurity, loss of access to common property, and social disarticulation.‖ His 
study was also influential in that it provided concrete guidelines for future resettlement 
projects and ―emphasized the importance of extending risk analysis to affected communities‖ 
(Scudder 2005:46). With the successes and challenges of resettlement presented above, we 
must now ask why these initiatives most often produce failure. 
 In his 50 dam study, Scudder found five statistically significant reasons behind failed 
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resettlement initiatives. They are as follows: ―lack of political will on the part of project 
authorities and governments, lack of finance for planning and implementing resettlement, 
lack of capacity in terms of numbers and expertise of resettlement staff, lack of development 
opportunities for improving livelihoods, and lack of community participation in the 
resettlement process‖ (Scudder 2009:28). In my examination of the Jonglei Canal and Aswan 
High Dam, below, these characteristics of failed resettlement processes will be apparent. 
 
The Jonglei Canal  
 It would be remiss to discuss anticipated hydro-projects in South Sudan without 
referencing the Jonglei Canal. For one, the partially completed project – SPLA rebels halted 
its construction in 1984 – has been the South‘s only experience with large scale hydro-
development and is ingrained in the memories of many Southern Sudanese. Second, the canal 
illustrates how transhumant populations have been ―resettled‖ or ―compensated‖ for the loss 
of their habitable areas. Considering how few settled communities exist in South Sudan, one 
can imagine that dams and irrigation projects, no matter how small, will disrupt the 
livelihoods of pastoral populations. Unlike upcoming agricultural development in South 
Sudan, the construction of the Jonglei project was explicitly not to the benefit of the southern 
Sudanese, and therefore held no possible benefits to local inhabitants. Furthermore, few 
provisions for compensation were made by the Egyptian and Sudanese governments. The 
impact of the canal was disastrous in terms of its environmental and human costs, and 
recognizing this fact, Southern Sudanese rebel leaders were able to mobilize popular support 
against the canal and, through violent means, stop its construction. Nevertheless, the 
livelihoods of local populations remain disrupted to this day as a result of poor planning and 
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implementation of the project.  
**  
Project Outcome: 
 While the Jonglei Canal project, the product of Anglo-Egyptian discourse on the 
Sudd, was first conceptualized in the early 20th century, construction did not begin until 
1978
14. If completed, the canal was expected to divert the White Nile‘s waters from the Sudd, 
adding billions of cubic liters to Egyptian and Sudanese water reserves. The effects of the 
canal on the Southern Sudanese people and environment were viewed as a necessary 
sacrifice for perceived downstream water needs – had Egypt been more efficient with its 
water use no need would have existed for years to come (Johnson 2003:47). In 1978, when 
excavators began to tear through the Sudd, a century and a half of Anglo-Egyptian discourse 
materialized into unprecedented physical violence against Southern Sudanese hydro-
geography; however, Egyptian-Sudanese action against the swamps was met by Southern 
resistance. 
 On February 8, 1984, the militant wing of the Sudan People‘s Liberation Movement 
(SPLM) attacked and overran the Camp and Headquarters of the Compagnie de Construction 
Internationales, a French company hired to build the Jonglei, effectively bringing its 
construction to a halt (Collins 2001:368). John Garang de Mabior, leader of the 
SPLM/SPLA, commented on these events in his publication ―The Genesis of the Sudan 
People‘s Liberation Movement:‖  
 
 
 
                                                 
14
 The reasons for this delay are enumerated at great length in Tvedt Terje's The River Nile in the Age of 
the British: Political Ecology & the Quest for Economic Power (2004).  
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The magnitude of these operations... forced CCI to stop digging the Jonglei Canal and 
Chevron Company to close down all its oil operations in the South. Hereafter, Nimieri 
[President of Sudan] can no longer deceive the Sudanese people that prosperity 
through exploitation of oil and water, is just around the corner. When the SPLA 
liberates our country under SPLM government, these two precious liquids shall be 
developed and used for the benefit of the whole Sudanese people (Collins 2001:368). 
 
Popular sentiment further reflected John Garang‘s feelings regarding northern exploitation of 
southern Sudanese resources: ―Selling out our land, selling out our water and sold our land 
out to be dug as [a] canal that brought bombs for revolution [sic]‖ became a rallying cry 
during the early years of the civil war (Deng Atem 2006). Considering the environmental and 
social ramifications of the Jonglei Canal, coupled with the northern (Arab) influence behind 
the project, southern Sudanese outrage is not surprising. The event of SPLA resistance 
against the Canal underscores the very political nature of development and demonstrates the 
need for development organizations to understand and incorporate the political into project 
plans. Fortunately for the people of South Sudan, the project has remained on hiatus since 
1984
15
. Nevertheless, the canal still impacts the day to day lives of the Southern Sudanese. 
 ―Sarah‖ and ―Lucy,‖ two of the European built canal excavators can be seen for miles 
in Jonglei state. Towering over the local landscape, the now inactive diggers serve as a 
constant reminder of the damage that these dormant machines did to South Sudan‘s hydro-
geography and people. Though only two-thirds complete (240 of 360 kms), the Jonglei Canal 
has permanently altered indigenous ways of life. In order to feed their cattle during the dry 
season, Dinka and Nuer herdsmen must make their way to the toic (grazing lands). However, 
the construction of the canal has disturbed this long practiced migration. While bridges were 
                                                 
15
 Since South Sudan's independence vote in January 2011 the Egyptian government has actively pursued the 
revival of the partially constructed canal. Given the human and environmental costs of the project the 
chances of the GoSS agreeing to its completion are slim to none. Nevertheless, Egypt's relentless attempts at 
canalizing South Sudan goes to show the longevity of Anglo-Egyptian discourse on the Sudd. 
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initially promised to facilitate cattle grazing, construction has yet to be seen. Dinka and Nuer 
herdsmen have been left to their own devices to reach the toic, which has resulted in the 
creation of makeshift ―ramps to drive their cattle across to the intermediate lands and the toic 
pastures‖ (Collins 1994:134). It is clear that the project resulted in a permanent decrease in 
the living standards of the affected South Sudanese.  
 
What went wrong? 
Planning:  
 As shown in chapter 3, Anglo-Egyptian officials, scientists and engineers spent 
decades planning the most effective way of extracting water from the Sudd. Charting, 
mapping, graphing, and aerial photography all contributed to designing the ―ideal‖ canal. 
From an Egyptian and Northern Sudanese point of view the canal was a saving grace, Cairo 
and Khartoum could increase their available water supply at minimal cost. While building the 
canal would incur a human and environmental toll in Southern Sudan, Northern powers were 
not concerned with these sacrifices – the southern region was Khartoum‘s hinterland, a place 
and people to be exploited. Thus, besides the canal‘s location, the project had little to do with 
Southern Sudan and all to do with the potential Northern hydro-benefits of its construction. 
This is best illustrated by the endeavors of the Jonglei Investigation Team and the ―planned‖ 
compensation offered to Southerners. 
 As an afterthought to thirty years of careful data collection and planning the Jonglei 
Investigation Team (JIT) was formed rather belatedly in 1946 by the Anglo-Sudanese 
government to assess the impact of the canal on the regional environment and local 
populations (Collins 1983:350). The final report of the JIT provided a qualitative analysis of 
75 
 
  
the major impacts of the Jonglei Canal on the southern Sudanese environment and 
indigenous peoples. To briefly summarize their conclusions, the JIT argued that any canal 
project in the Sudd would result in a significant reduction in seasonal flooding and the drying 
of large areas of the swamp regions. As mentioned previously, the livelihoods of the Shilluk, 
Nuer and Dinka (to name but a few of the ethnic groups inhabiting the region) are dependent 
on the grazing lands created by the seasonal flooding. Furthermore, the JIT contended that 
the drying of the swamps could lead to a significant decline in fisheries, which at times 
contributed to indigenous food security. Despite the cautionary report, Egypt and Sudan 
began to actively pursue the canal project in the 1970s.  
 By 1974 the Jonglei Canal was approved by the Sudanese Ministry of Irrigation and  
Agriculture to supply water to newly planned agricultural expansion in Sudan and Egypt. It 
was projected that the South would also receive some minor benefits in the form of 
―improved transport, cash crop production schemes, drinking water and drainage.‖ According 
to Douglas Johnson, ―from this point onwards, support of the canal project almost became a 
prerequisite to any Southern politician wishing to maintain an active political career‖ 
(Johnson 2003:47). In fact, Khartoum managed to silence public opposition to the project by 
violently squashing a demonstration against the canal in Juba, described below:  
When agreement on digging the canal was reached in February 1974, rumors started 
to circulate in Southern Sudan that some two million Egyptian peasants would be 
resettled in the canal area to farm the potential irrigated area that would be opened up 
by the canal. Heavy rioting broke out in Juba, Capital of the Autonomous Southern 
Sudan, in October 1974 leaving 3 people dead and about 200 arrested, including 
members of the Regional Assembly of Parliament (De Mabior 1980:53). 
 
 As a formality the Sudanese government made provisions to compensate local populations 
by building roads, constructing bridges across the canal to facilitate cattle herding, and laying 
76 
 
  
down fresh water piping (Johnson 2003: 48). The construction of the canal was also 
anticipated to facilitate large scale agriculture in the region, as chronicled by De Mabior. No 
accommodations were made for resettling displaced communities. Perhaps part of this lack of 
resettlement foresight lies in the migratory nature of Southern Sudanese transhumant 
populations; however, it would be more apt to attribute the lack of resettlement planning to 
purposeful Northern neglect of the South.  
 
“Resettlement:” 
 It is clear that the planning behind the Jonglei Canal was intentionally one sided. 
Egypt and Khartoum developed a project that would benefit them at whatever cost to the 
people and environment of Southern Sudan. Given these circumstances the only way to 
determine the ―success‖ of the ―resettlement‖ phase of the Jonglei Canal is in terms of the 
delivery of compensation measures promised to the Southern Sudanese, which on the surface 
aimed at bettering the living conditions of the affected populations. 
 While Sudanese officials rhetorically set aside funds to build roads, bridges, fresh 
water piping, and to develop the region‘s agriculture, none of these projects were delivered as 
promised. Instead they were either cheaply built, or not at all. Furthermore, while cash crop 
production schemes were envisioned by Khartoum, they eventually cancelled their 
development due to high startup costs and maintenance. Socio-economic development in 
Jonglei was limited to the construction of a few schools and rain water reservoirs (Johnson 
2003:48). On the whole, the project did not serve the people of South Sudan and resulted in a 
decline in their living conditions. 
 
77 
 
  
What can be learned from the Jonglei Canal? 
 As the development community begin to draw up plans for agricultural growth, the 
Jonglei Canal highlights the need for projects to give equal consideration to the economic 
benefits and the human and environmental costs of development. As highlighted by the 
World Commission on Dams report, central to the planning process should be a commitment 
to communication with local populations and well-thought out and adequate resettlement and 
compensation initiatives. Developers must keep in mind that the human and environmental 
costs of hydro-projects are unavoidable; however, through careful planning and resettlement 
procedures, a repeat of the Jonglei Canal is avoidable..  
** 
The Aswan High Dam: The Sudanese Experience 
 In 1959 the governments of Egypt and Sudan signed a revised Nile Waters Agreement 
– the first was signed in 1929 – which on top of allocating annual Nile water usage quotas for 
each country, allowed for the construction of the Aswan High Dam. Besides being an 
architectural wonder – the completed dam stands 111 meters tall and nearly four kilometers 
wide – the High Dam would ―protect‖ Egypt from floods and drought by permanently storing 
water in what is now called Lake Nasser. Furthermore, the saved water would allow Egypt to 
pursue ambitious agricultural growth in previously inaccessible desert regions, and would 
produce 10 billion kilowatts of electricity. Sudan would also benefit from the dam‘s 
construction, as the 1959 Agreement derived Khartoum‘s new Nile quota (18.5 billion) from 
the water to be stored in Lake Nasser. Economically speaking, the High Dam‘s construction 
was beneficial to both countries – the increase in Egyptian agricultural productivity and 
hydropower paid off the dam‘s cost within two years – however, the construction of the dam 
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was not without significant human costs (Scudder 2003).  
 Along with the construction of the Aswan High Dam came the forced displacement of 
100,000-120,000 Nubians, whose homeland of Nubia, its towns and historic ruins, now lies 
at the bottom of Lake Nasser. The focus of this section will be the experience of the 50,000-
70,000 Sudanese Nubians who were relocated to Khashm el Girba, 850 kilometers south of 
their homeland (Sørbø 1985:12). Unlike the Egyptian Nubians whose resettlement has been 
viewed as a success (Scudder 2003), the relocation of Sudanese Nubians was poorly planned, 
sloppily executed and failed to benefit or adequately compensate the displaced population.  
 The Aswan High Dam was also an articulation of foreign political interests in the 
region. As Egypt could not finance the High Dam on its own, President Nasser turned to the 
international community for assistance. The Cold War political climate allowed for Nasser to 
pit the United States and USSR against each other in a funding war for Egypt‘s political 
allegiance. While the United States was initially supportive of the dams construction it 
eventually withdrew its pledged funds as Nasser‘s ties with the USSR grew stronger. The 
funding war came to a close when the Russian government pledged and delivered a twenty 
year loan of $1,120,000,000 at 2% interest (Dougherty 1959:23). Considering the political 
and economic interests the international community hold in South Sudan, it would not be 
surprising for the construction of dams to be well funded and supported by foreign 
governments.  
 
Project Outcome: 
 Unlike the Jonglei Canal, the Aswan High Dam was completed with very little violent 
resistance from Nubian populations. While demonstrations were held in Wadi Halfa, the 
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largest town in Sudanese Nubia, prior to relocation, they were targeted against the way the 
Government of Sudan was handling their resettlement, not the Aswan project itself. As 
expanded upon below, Khashm el Girba, the resettlement site, was not popular amongst 
displaced Nubians. Nevertheless, Khartoum carried on with its controversial choice. The 
results were devastating. Little to no attention was paid to Nubian livelihoods in the 
development of the resettlement site, well reflected in Nubian reactions to their new home, as 
well as in the long term repercussions of relocation.  
 To Sudanese Nubians, Khashm el Girba, their new home, was an alien landscape both 
geographically and climatically. As opposed to the dry climate of Wadi Halfa, Khashm el 
Girba was located in a tropical region with violent rains and storms – this alone ―had 
devastating psychological effects on the displaced persons‖ (Deng 2007:50-51). Hand in 
hand with the change in climate came a forced change in livelihoods. While the Nubian 
community, prior to resettlement, had depended on subsistence farming and remittances from 
a large migrant work force as result of the desert environment, upon arrival to New Halfa 
they were expected to make a living through irrigated agriculture. This miscalculation on the 
part of planners resulted in the long term failure of the resettlement scheme. As observed by 
anthropologist Gunnar Sørbø during fieldwork conducted between 1970-1977:  
Whereas date-production at Wadi Halfa tended to bring rather stable cash incomes, 
with a minimum of effort and supported by subsistence agriculture, an increasing 
number of people who were active labour contributors within traditional agriculture 
have come to depend entirely on others for their subsistence. This is particularly true 
for older men and widows. It is also true for tenant families which, lacking a viable 
occupation in other sectors, are unable to secure a sufficient and steady income from 
tenancy cultivation. Such families will grow increasingly dependant on others for 
financial help or credit or may be forced to leave for work elsewhere. (Sørbø 
1985:89). 
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Sørbø also observed a steady out migration of Nubians from New Halfa and the breaking 
down of social bonds between Nubian communities (Sørbø 1985:90). Thus, it is safe to say 
that the government of Sudan failed to successfully resettle the dam affected population. It is 
not surprising then to consider that decades later, some of these displaced Nubians joined 
forces with SPLA at the beginning of the Sudanese Civil War to fight against Khartoum (de 
Villiers 2001). 
 
What went wrong? 
Initial Reactions to Project and Planning:  
We pray to God and complain, 
that we do not care for the waters of Atbara,  
nor the life of the desert.  
If we declare our protest publicly, 
handcuffs will be our reward. 
If we remain silent, then Halfa will be lost. 
We have nothing to do but be patient. 
- Salih Musa, Nubian Poet (Sørbø 1985:139) 
 
 The announcement of the Aswan High Dam project on Egyptian and Sudanese radio 
stations on November 10th, 1959 shocked the Nubian community. Years of political deadlock 
and funding complications had led them to believe that no agreement between Cairo and 
Khartoum would be reached. According to one Sudanese official living in Wadi Halfa, ―many 
[Nubians] were so shocked that they could not believe their ears and ran into the streets in the 
hope of finding someone who could tell them something different... Individuals were seen to 
be walking alone in the streets, talking aloud to themselves looking left and right, gazing in 
astonishment...‖ (Dafalla 1975:89-90). In a few years their homeland would be swallowed by 
the very river which had given them life since ancient times, a loss recognized by the 
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Sudanese government.  
 On December 6, a month after the project‘s announcement, Sudanese President 
Abboud paid a visit to Wadi Halfa to ease the anxiety and grief that Nubians were 
experiencing and to let them know that Khartoum would do everything in its power to 
provide adequate compensation for their loss. During a tearful address to the people of Wadi 
Halfa, President Abboud stated:  
I am aware of your great difficulties and the gravity of your situation. I tell you 
sincerely that my mind is fully occupied in finding a solution to your imperative 
problem. I declare that I undertake to provide you with good livelihood and fair and 
equitable compensation for all your property which will be lost, and that every one of 
you can be assured of the  preservation of his rights... As for the selection of your 
new home... I promise to accept your choice of place, wherever you want to go, in 
any part of the Sudan, and that none of you will be forced to go anywhere against his 
will. (Dafalla 1975:92) 
 
 President Abboud followed up his address by signing a twelve point petition drawn up 
by a local committee of Nubians, which, among other things, promised that ―The inhabitants 
should be resettled in the most suitable site from the economic, social and health point of 
view... [and that] the people should be resettled in a manner which would preserve the 
identity and unity of their community.‖ For Sudanese Nubians the President‘s trip 
temporarily lifted the burden of resettlement as the government was fully committed to their 
future wellbeing (Dafalla 1975:92). However, it soon became clear that their opinions would 
not be heard, as Khartoum prioritized technical, quantitative research over qualitative 
analysis of livelihoods, and envisioned Nubian resettlement as an opportunity to create a 
large scale, modernist agricultural scheme.  
 Central to resettlement planning was the gathering of statistical data to determine the 
number of houses to be built and adequate compensation for economic losses incurred in the 
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move. Information was gathered on ―...population , dwelling houses, furniture, household 
equipment and baggage in Halfa town; livestock in the town; furniture and livestock in the 
area (a sample), and  income and expenditure and diet‖ (Dafalla 1975:98).  Hassan Dafalla, a 
government employee stationed in Wadi Halfa, described the process as tedious; however, 
once completed he claimed that ―the facts conveyed in its [the census‘] tables melted away 
all the clouds of ignorance and for the first time we had a clear view of the situation‖ 
(1975:98). Aside from the complications of quantifying compensation for the loss of one‘s 
homeland, the census, like the case of Jonglei, masked Nubian livelihoods behind a veil of 
statistics.  
 Adhering to the president‘s promise, a vote was conducted to allow the Nubian people 
to choose their preferred resettlement location. Following two votes – the first was nullified 
due to voter fraud – the final tally listed North Gezira, Kadaru area and Wadi el Khawi as the 
top three choices for resettlement. Khashm el Girba, the location of their eventual 
resettlement received significantly fewer votes, a meager 349 of a total 4620 ballots cast
16
 
(Dafalla 1975:118-119). Unfortunately for the soon to be resettled Nubians, the vote was 
merely a formality, as their new home had been selected by Khartoum well ahead of time.  
 It so happened that the relocation of Nubians coincided with the Government of 
Sudan‘s plans to build a dam on the Atbara River, in the Khashm el Girba region. Sudanese 
officials believed that by resettling ―experienced farmers‖ to Khashm el Girba they could 
both provide a living area for the displaced, as well as establish a new profitable agricultural 
scheme (Sørbø 1985:58). Considering that Nubians traditionally practiced subsistence 
                                                 
16
 This figure was taken from the first ballot, as the breakdown of the second vote is unavailable to me; 
however, as voter fraud was only contributed more votes to the Kadaru area, this statistic is representative of 
Nubian feelings towards Khashm el Girba.  
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farming and didn‘t possess the necessary skills to undertake large irrigated agriculture, it is 
clear that the government‘s decision was not well thought out. Furthermore, though never 
explicitly stated by the Sudanese government, the decision on Khashm el Girba can also be 
viewed as an effort to extend state control to a relatively autonomous community. As a 
region, Nubia had for centuries remained an isolated part of Sudan. Located in an 
―inaccessible‖ desert, it has been described as a ―country of its own,‖ and had remained 
largely unaffected by political events in Sudan (Dafalla 1975:45). While the government of 
Sudan offered Nubians six potential sites for resettlement, Khashm el Girba was also selected 
due to the fact that ―all the villages could be joined up by road system [sic] and the area 
could have a railway link with the main Kassala-Khartoum line‖ (Dafalla 1975:129). This 
news was not well received by the people of Wadi Halfa.  
 On October 22, delegates from the Sudanese government arrived in Wadi Halfa to 
officially announce Khashm el Girba as their future home. Their visit created a venue for 
Nubians to vent their frustrations with the Sudanese government. Initially, only a small 
demonstration was mobilized, comprising two hundred men. Police were quick to silence 
their opposition and arrested seventy people. Upon hearing the news, President Abboud 
instructed the police to release the detained Nubians, and instructed officers to allow Nubians 
to voice their anger against the project, as long as it remained peaceful. Rumors soon began 
to circulate, which soon took ―took the form that President Abboud had instructed the police 
not to use force, even if the inhabitants killed them to the last man.‖ By the early afternoon, a 
group of 3,000 men had assembled in Degheim village. Armed with sticks and stones, they 
began to block traffic and cut telephone wires. By 4 pm they began to move towards the Nile 
Hotel where Sudanese officials were residing. They began to voice criticisms of President 
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Abboud‘s promises, and were soon met by a group of women who chanted ―‗Fadiru wala 
hagumunno Khashm el Griba la‘ (‗We prefer to die than go to Khashm el Girba‘).‖ Violence 
soon broke out between the demonstrators and police forces, who used tear gas to disperse 
the crowd. Several hours later the scuffle ended, leaving three police officers injured (Dafalla 
1975:129-132). At long last Nubian concerns with their resettlement were voiced on the 
national level, yet these demonstrations fell upon deaf ears, and popular resistance against the 
dam began to falter.  
 In a last ditch effort to reinvigorate Nubian protest against resettlement, rumors began 
to circulate about Khashm el Girba. According to Hassan Dafalla, 
Besides conjuring up a savage picture of the Hadandawa and Zebeidia tribes, they 
said that the water of the river Atbara was polluted with virulent organisms and was 
as yellow as horses‘ urine, and that the rains there were torrential; and they spoke of 
thunderbolts that would make the atomic bomb of Hiroshima appear mild... they 
[also] said that in Khashm el Girba there was a strange disease that would impregnate 
men, and there were apes that would rape women. (1975:137). 
 
The rumors went on to say that Khartoum was well aware of the aforementioned problems 
with Khashm el Girba, yet was prepared to force Nubians onto the trains at gunpoint. The 
government was able to counter these rumors by announcing that resettlement would not be 
compulsory, and that people could make their own living arrangements once Wadi Halfa was 
swallowed by the Nile (Dafalla 1975:137-138). Nevertheless, while the government did not 
force affected Nubians onto trains at gunpoint, the resettlement process was traumatic and 
poorly executed.  
** 
Resettlement:  
 When Egypt and Sudan signed the Nile Waters Agreement, it was decided that by July 
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1963 the relocation of affected populations was to be complete; to delay the move any longer 
would leave local populations susceptible to floods and the rising waters of Lake Nasser, 
which began to fill in 1964. The Government of Sudan was not able to meet this deadline; in 
fact, they weren‘t able to relocate all the Nubians until November 23, 1965, though the 
evacuation began in January 1964 ( Sørbø 1985:58). Fortunately, it was not until September 
1st, 1965 that the Nile began to flood Wadi Halfa, at which point few people were left in the 
town (Dafalla 1975:253).  This delay can be attributed to complications with construction 
companies and natural disasters which further postponed the resettlement process. 
Unfortunately for the displaced Nubians, this delay was but the tip in the iceberg of problems 
they would encounter in their journey to and arrival in New Halfa. 
 At first, the transfer of Nubians to Khashm el Girba ran smoothly – trains were 
moving people and their belongings in a timely manner – yet environmental conditions soon 
inhibited the resettlement process. Storms and floods brought the trains to a halt and some 
resettlers found themselves trapped in passenger cars for days on end – in one instance an 
elderly passenger passed away during these delays. At the resettlement site these storms also 
levied a psychological toll on relocated Nubians, ―who had an ingrained fear of rain and 
thunder.‖ In one instance a ―...woman was so frightened that she locked her two children in a 
cupboard‖ (Dafalla 1975:251-252). Immediately it became clear to resettled Nubians that the 
environmental conditions of Khashm el Girba were entirely different than the dry climate of 
Nubia – the first of many psychological shocks they would experience.  
 Soon after resettlement, it became clear that the Government of Sudan was insensitive 
to the psychological cost of resettlement. For example, on the day after the first batch of 
resettlers arrived to New Halfa, they were ―invited‖ to start working their new farms. 
86 
 
  
Khartoum worried that Sudan would incur a national loss if resettled Nubians missed the 
year‘s annual rotation. Thus, on top of facing the challenges of moving into a new home, the 
Nubians were expected to adapt to new agricultural practice as well. In South Sudan where 
hydrological development and agricultural expansion will go hand in hand, this flawed 
practice may be repeated. 
 
What can be learned?  
 The case of the Aswan High Dam exemplifies the need for development actors to 
move beyond their ―universal science‖ of development planning and prioritize constant 
communication with displaced populations, for without their input resettlement initiatives 
can produce disastrous effects. Furthermore, the resettlement of Nubians is particularly 
salient in the case of South Sudan where the development community has overlooked local 
livelihoods.  
 In conjunction with the construction of the Aswan High Dam, the Government of 
Sudan used the displacement of affected Nubians as an opportunity to increase national 
agricultural output. Khashm el Girba, the resettlement site, was selected due to its proximity 
to a new dam project which would provide the necessary irrigation for large scale farming; 
however, the Government of Sudan‘s modernist agricultural desires failed to account for 
interconnectedness of humans and the environment. While the Government of Sudan 
anticipated Nubian resettlers to be ―experienced farmers,‖ they did not account for the fact 
that Nubian expertise was specific to northern Sudan‘s ecology. Date and subsistence farming 
were their specialty, not the large-scale irrigated agriculture required at Khashm el Girba. 
Due to these misunderstandings of local traditions, the resettlement initiative failed both to 
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increase Sudanese crop output and provide adequate compensation for displaced Nubians. In 
South Sudan, where agricultural development is a national priority, the necessity of planners 
to consider the livelihoods of affected populations and the environmental conditions of their 
resettlement sites cannot be stressed enough.  
 
The World Commission on Dams: A Way Forward?  
 The problematic histories of large scale hydro-projects like the Jonglei Canal and 
Aswan Dam and their accompanying resettlement initiatives have come under international 
scrutiny over the past few decades. During the 1990s, outcry against the large-dams reached 
such a fever pitch that the World Bank, the biggest financial and political supporter of large 
dams, agreed to fund, alongside the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), 
an independent commission – what came to be known as the World Commission on Dams – 
to research and produce new guidelines for the construction of dams. The 2000 publication of 
the World Commission on Dams (WCD) report – which to this day ―remains, the most 
global, holistic, systematic, comprehensive, participatory, and scientifically valid assessment 
of large dam building to date‖ (Goodland 2010:385) – produced seven necessary criteria to 
minimize the harm of dam construction and maximize, where possible, the benefits of 
resettlement for displaced populations. The seven points are as follows: 1) Gaining Public 
Acceptance; 2) Comprehensive Options Assessment;  3) Sustaining Rivers and Livelihoods; 
4) Global Priority; 5) Recognizing Entitlements and Sharing Benefits; 6) Ensuring 
Compliance; and 7) Sharing Rivers for Peace, Development and Security. Furthermore, it 
established five foundational values for successful projects: equity, efficiency, partcipatory 
decision-making, sustainability and accountability (WCD 2000). Central to the WCD‘s 
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guidelines was an increase in cooperation between affected peoples and project planners; 
however, for the most part these guidelines have yet to translate into improved practice.   
 Upon publication the WCD was subject to both praise and criticism from different 
circles invested in future development projects. Critics, such as Navawala (2001), argued that 
the report operated from a biased anti-dam ideology and failed to recognize the positive 
aspects of dam building and the necessity of such projects in countries like India where 
drinking water, food and electricity will become increasingly strained as the country‘s 
population continues its exponential growth. In direct response to Navawala,  Sengupta 
(2001) argued that such criticisms were unfounded as the WCD devoted an entire section to 
the benefits of dams and recognized them as a necessary development option in certain cases. 
Thayer Scudder, a strong proponent of the WCD and one of its committee members, further 
supports the importance of the WCDs guidelines claiming that, ―Though it does not attempt 
to recommend a new globally applicable framework for designing a new development 
paradigm, it provides a first step in that direction‖ (2001:340). Some development 
organizations also hailed the WCD report. For example, the WHO responded to its 
publication stating that: 
The report of the World Commission on Dams is a landmark report for all 
development stakeholders... the report deserves a strong endorsement by the relevant 
UN Specialized agencies... it has laid the foundations for a new approach to 
development in the coming decade. If the report meets with the broad support from all 
development stakeholders, then the scene is set for truly sustainable development in 
the 21
st
 century (Scudder 2001: 340). 
 
However, while some development actors supported the WCD, the historically most 
important party in dam building, the World Bank, withdrew its support from the final report 
and soundly rejected its findings. Thus, while the WCD sought to improve the detrimental 
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outcomes of dam construction, since its publication its guidelines have yet to be implemented 
on a large scale. 
 While the WCD, for about seven years, managed to slow the construction of large 
dams, since 2008 dam financing has soared to unprecedented levels. In 2010, the World Bank 
was in the process of financing about US$2 billion worth of dam projects. One the largest of 
these projects, Nam Theum 2 Dam in Laos has come under recent criticism from 
environmentalists after it illegally began operations, violating its obligations to affected 
populations. According to Ikuko Matsumoto, the Lao Director of International Rivers, ―The 
Nam Theun 2 Power Company is operating the dam without complying with its Concession 
Agreement. The project is violating people‘s human rights by preventing access to clean 
water and by destroying critical food sources without providing compensation‖ (International 
Rivers 2010). Other scholars, however, argue that it is too early in Nam Theun‘s development 
to draw conclusions about its outcome. For example, Thayer Scudder, who has been 
intimately involved in research on the dam, claims that despite Matsumoto‘s critique it is too 
the project may result in a medium-term success (personal communication, April 2
nd
, 2012). 
Only the coming years will tell whether Nam Theun 2 will emerge as a success; however, the 
early developments in NT2 construction suggest that even after funding intensive research on 
dam construction, the World Bank has been unable to move beyond its ―high modernist‖ 
worldview. 
  The case of Turkey‘s Ilisu Dam also illustrates the resistance of State governments to 
incorporate the findings of the WCD into project plans. While international donors such as 
the World Bank withdrew financial support from the dam when the indisputable and grave 
human and environmental costs of its construction became apparent, the Turkish State has 
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gone on to pursue the Ilisu Dam‘s construction on its own. In 2009, the Turkish Environment 
Minister Veysel Ergolu stated that, ―These [hydro-electric] power plants will be built. No one 
can stop it. This is the decision of the state and the government" (Brinlee 2012). By 2010, the 
Turkish government secured the necessary funds to go ahead with the project and its 
completion date is set for 2014. As the development community are not the only actors in 
agricultural development in South Sudan, it is necessary to indicate that as of this writing the 
GoSS also holds similar ―high modernist‖ views of the country‘s future – characterizing 
agricultural expansion as ―agro-industrial‖ - and may follow in the footsteps of the Turkish 
government. 
 Despite the fact that eventual hydro-development in South Sudan will occur on a 
smaller scale than the cases of Jonglei, Aswan, Nam Theun 2, and Ilisu the framework put 
forth by the WCD remains applicable; however, as documented throughout this study, 
development actors in South Sudan remain spellbound by their ―universal‖ and ―scientific‖ 
model of social planning. With South Sudan expected to become a subject of increased 
scholarly inquiry, follow up studies on the planning process and outcomes of development 
may uncover whether the disconnect between the development community and local 
populations remains a part of development practice several years down the road; however, I 
am inclined to believe that until a paradigm shift occurs in the development worldview – not 
present in South Sudan as of this writing – development actors will continue to produce 
harmful and unintended project outcomes.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 In this thesis, I explored questions of development, water and agriculture in South 
Sudan, which, thus far, has received scant attention in contemporary scholarship. In the 
process, I showed that while two hundred years have passed since the beginnings of ―high 
modernist‖ planning in South Sudan the ―scientific‖ worldview of social planners, old and 
new, has remained largely the same. I did so by examining two centuries of discourse on 
South Sudan‘s and its role in shaping development projects in the region. I looked 
specifically at development actors‘ inattention to South Sudan‘s environmental and human 
realties, which complicate its treatment as a simplistic universally-understandable ―object‖ of 
development and examined the role of water in upcoming agricultural development. Lastly, I 
looked towards South Sudan‘s future and asked what can be learned from a comparative 
analysis of past hydro-projects in Sudan‘s past and showed that while new guidelines exist to 
avoid previous failings, development actors have yet translate such literature into improved 
practice. In Chapter 1, I presented my argument, introduced my research methodology, and 
situated my study in the theories of Ferguson (1990), Scott (1998) and Scudder (2005). In 
Chapter 2, I described the geography, people and ecology of South Sudan and its history 
from pre-colonial times to the present. In Chapter 3, I established a historical point of 
reference for contemporary development in South Sudan and examined Anglo-Egyptian 
discourse, which characterized the region‘s hydro-geography as ―dangerous‖ and ―wasteful‖ 
and resulted in in detrimental ―high modernist‖ planning processes. In Chapter 4, I 
documented the continuation of colonial era planning through a qualitative analysis of 
development reports and new articles on South Sudan and showed that in the formative 
stages of development NGOs, IGOs and the GoSS have yet to critically engage with the 
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hydrological nature of agricultural expansion. Lastly, in Chapter 5, I asked what the 
development community in South Sudan can learn from past ecologically disruptive projects, 
specifically referencing the Jonglei Canal and Aswan High Dam. I also showed that there has 
been active resistance on the part of some development organizations, such as the World 
Bank, to incorporate the WCD framework which seeks to put an end to the detrimental 
legacies of large hydro-projects. 
 I began this thesis interrogating the international silence on the question of the Nile in 
South Sudan‘s future. I argued that this absence was symptomatic of a much larger historical 
process of international actors neglecting South Sudan‘s environmental and human realities 
as a result of ―high modernist‖ worldviews. As shown in Chapter 2, the environmental 
conditions produced by the Nile River have influenced the lives and modes of subsistence of 
the Nuer and various other transhumant populations in South Sudan. 
 Central to this thesis has been an interrogation of the past to inform South Sudan‘s 
present. The concept of plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose, runs throughout this study. 
While the foreign powers involved in South Sudan have changed over time, the lens through 
which they view the region and its ecology and subsequent responses have not; similarly, 
while wars and canal building have challenged South Sudanese transhumance, modes of 
subsistence have remained largely unchanged and are still inextricably tied to the 
environmental conditions of the region. During the colonial period South Sudan came to be 
characterized as ―dangerous‖ and ―wasteful‖ by foreign travelers, government officials, 
scientists and engineers. The link between South Sudanese livelihoods, water and territory 
was invisible to these extra-Sudanese actors, who viewed the region‘s swamps as an 
impediment to upstream travel and upstream agricultural development. At present South 
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Sudan is subject to similar scrutiny by the international community. Contemporary discourse 
has envisioned the country as poor and food insecure and have prescribed agricultural growth 
as an antidote to these ills; however, the South Sudanese are not accustomed to sedentary 
agriculture, and the region‘s environment, as it is currently ―organized,‖ further inhibits large 
scale agriculture.  
 It is clear that over the past two hundred years the local livelihoods have remained 
invisible to foreign administrations and institutions and the Sudanese and South Sudanese 
States. Why has this been the case? The work of Scott (1998) is essential to understanding 
this stark divide between international conceptions of nature and local realities. Though 
Scudder (2005) invokes Scott in regards to the construction of large dams, the following 
application is useful in contextualizing Anglo-Egyptian and contemporary ignorance of South 
Sudan‘s ecology: ―heads of state or other politicians and central planners... have a vision of 
the future involving mastery of nature that is ‗unscientifically optimistic about the 
possibilities for the comprehensive planning of human settlement and production,‘ whereas in 
reality, the lives of affected rural communities are interwoven with nature and especially the 
annual regime of free-flowing rivers‖ (Scudder 2005: 49). Furthermore, as Scott goes on to 
say in Seeing Like a State, the State and development engineers tend to view nature and 
people through a technical and empirical lens which cannot account for local environmental 
and human diversity. Thus, until international actors begin to incorporate local knowledge 
into project formation and implementation, one can anticipate that South Sudan‘s ecology 
will remain invisible and that the region will continue to be mischaracterized by international 
actors as seen over the past two hundred years – plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose. 
 While the physical articulation of agricultural development in South Sudan remains 
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unknown – plans for irrigation schemes and dams have yet to be proposed – an examination 
of recurrent themes in past ecologically disruptive projects may help us understand what is in 
store for the region. In Chapter 5, I reviewed the cases of the Jonglei Canal and Aswan High 
Dam, both of which led to a significant decrease in living conditions for the Sudanese – the 
same holds true for the vast majority of hydrological development projects across the globe. 
Over the past few decades anthropological scholarship has done well to assess the effects of 
dam construction and resettlement initiatives. These critiques have provoked institutional 
funding of research on the relative failures and successes of such projects such as the World 
Commission on Dams report. For the most part scholarship has focused on the construction 
of large dams and the accompanying resettlement initiatives; nevertheless, these policy 
recommendations are applicable in the case of South Sudan where projects associated with 
agricultural growth will be on a much smaller scale. New policy guidelines have highlighted 
the necessity of incorporating local knowledge and involving affected populations in dam 
project formation and resettlement initiatives. If these suggestions are actively implemented 
there is hope that previous failures may be avoided; however, as shown in the case of South 
Sudan there is little hope that these guidelines will be adhered to.  
 In order for large scale agricultural development to occur in South Sudan there is a 
necessity for not only small dams, but also irrigation schemes and large farming operations. 
Each of these seemingly benign projects hold grave implications for South Sudan. As an 
example, by cordoning off land for farming operations, the transhumant practices of the 
South Sudanese will certainly be disrupted. Yet these effects of transforming South Sudan 
into an ―agro-industrial powerhouse‖ have gone largely unnoticed due to the problematic 
worldview of development actors and the South Sudanese state. If the international 
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community and GoSS are not talking about issues of resettlement and changes in livelihoods 
in the planning stages of agricultural transformation, it is unlikely that they will be able to 
effectively respond to the unintended consequences of their involvement in the region – a 
bleak sign for the South Sudanese. 
 In 2001 Scudder stated that the WCD provided a first step towards ―designing a new 
development paradigm‖ (2001:340). While the unprecedented research and scholarly 
collaboration that went into the WCD indicates that designing new theoretical paradigms for 
global development are possible, the World Bank‘s rejection of the WCDs findings and the 
persistence of the ―high modernist‖ worldview of development actors in the emergent 
discourse on South Sudan indicate that the development community and GoSS are not ready 
for such change – plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose. 
 
 
96 
 
  
Bibliography 
 
Actually, John 
2011 ―Jonglei awaits lower than expected harvest.‖ Sudan Tribune, September 18th, 
2011, accessed January 15
th
, 2011, http://www.sudantribune.com/Jonglei-awaits-
lower-than-expected,40187. 
 
Ahmad, A.M.  
 2008 ―Post-Jonglei planning in southern Sudan: Combining environment with 
 development.‖ Environment and Urbanization. 20 (2): 575-586.  
 
African Development Bank 
2011 ―South Sudan Development Plan: Medium Term Capacity Development 
Strategy. 4
th
 Draft.‖ African Development Bank. http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int 
/files/reliefweb_pdf/node-426709.pdf, accessed October 24, 2011. 
 
Al Jazeera 
2011 “Cairo to Recognize South Sudan.” Al Jazeera, March 27th, 2011, accessed 
March  31
st
, 2011, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2011/03 
/201132721626404671.html 
  
Baker, Anne, Florence Baker, Samuel White Baker, and Julian Baker.  
1972 Morning Star: Florence Baker's diary of the expedition to put down the slave 
trade on the Nile, 1870-1873. London: William Kimber.  
 
Barber, Rebecca  
2011 ―Getting It Right from the Start: Priorities for Action in the New Republic of 
South Sudan. Joint Report.‖ Oxford, UK: Oxfam GB for Oxfam International. 
 http://www.ciaonet.org/pbei/oxfam/0022985/f_0022985_18810.pdf, accessed October 
2, 2011. 
 
Beswick, Stephanie. 
 2004 Sudan's Blood Memory. Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press.  
 
Brinlee, Morgan 
 2012 ―Turkey's Ilisu Dam Threatens Ancient Town.‖ WorldPress, March 9th, 2012, 
 accessed March 20
th
, 2012, http://worldpress.org/Europe/3891.cfm.  
 
Boueri, Kevin. 
2011. ―New Challenges to Egypt's Historical Dominance of the Nile River.‖ Paper 
 presented at the annual meeting for the Sudan Studies Association, Columbus, Ohio, 
May 12-15th, 2011.  
 
 
 
 
97 
 
  
Central Intelligence Agency 
 2011 ―The World Factbook: South Sudan.‖ Central Intelligence Agency. 
 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/od.html, accessed 
 December, 17th, 2011.  
 
Cernea, Michael M.  
2000 ―Risks, Safeguards and Reconstruction: A Model for Population Displacement 
and Resettlement.‖ Economic and Political Weekly. 35 (41): 3659-3678.  
 
Clinton, Hillary 
2011 ―Remarks at the International Engagement Conference for South Sudan.‖ 
Speech given at the International Engagement Conference for South Sudan, 
Washington, DC, December 14
th
, 2011. 
 
CNN 
 2011 ―South Sudan expatriates flock home to witness birth of new nation.‖ CNN. July 
 8th, 2011. http://articles.cnn.com/2011-07-08/world/sudan.expatriates.hope_1_juba-
 sudan-s-muslim-south-sudan?_s=PM:WORLD. 
 
Collins, Robert O.  
1962 The Southern Sudan, 1883-1898: A Struggle for Control. New Haven, 
Connecticut: Yale University Press. 
 
1983 Shadows in the grass: Britain in the southern Sudan, 1918-1956. New Haven: 
Yale University Press. 
 
1994 ―History, Hydropolitics and the Nile: Nile Control: Myth or Reality?‖ In The 
Nile: sharing a scarce resource. P.P. Howell and J.A. Allan, eds. Pp. 109-135. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 134.  
 
 2002 The Nile. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
 2003 A history of modern Sudan. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Dafalla, Ḥasan  
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